Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Volume 39
Issue 3 May 2006

Article 3

2006

Linking the International Legal Framework to Building the Formal
Foundations of a "State at Risk"
Michael Schoiswohl

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael Schoiswohl, Linking the International Legal Framework to Building the Formal Foundations of a
"State at Risk", 39 Vanderbilt Law Review 819 (2021)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vjtl/vol39/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For
more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

Linking
the
International
Legal
Framework to Building the Formal
Foundations of a "State at Risk":
Constitution-Making and International
Law in Post-Conflict Afghanistan
Michael Schoiswohl*
Abstract
This Article describes and critically assesses the recent
constitution-making process in Afghanistan in relation to the
internationallegal framework. The Article provides an account
of that process within the larger context of the state-building
efforts as envisioned in the 2001 Bonn Agreement. Focusing on
the
interaction between
national state-building and
international normative benchmarks, the Article evaluates the
extent to which the recently adopted Constitution links to the
international legal framework. While paying lip service to the
adherence of internationallaw, including internationalhuman
rights law, the Constitution does not adequately address the
relationship between international legal obligations and
municipal law. This Article argues that the failure to adopt a
specific mechanism as to how international law can be
effectuated within the internal legal system provides ample
leeway for an application of the Constitution which may
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Austria on May 20-21, 2005. The Article draws upon the fruitful discussions and
comments made at the workshop and I am most grateful to the organizers-Gerhard
Thallinger, Harald Eberhard and Konrad Lachmayer-as well as its participants for
having provided such a fertile forum to share and further refine its contents. A special
word of appreciation goes to Dr. Eckart Schiewek (UNAMA), Prof. Massimo Papa
(University of Bologna), Ebrahim Afsah, M.Phil. MPA (Max Planck, Heidelberg), and
Dr. Stephan Wittich (University of Vienna) for their most helpful comments on an
earlier version of this Article. It goes without saying that all omissions and errors are
those of the Author. The views expressed herein are those of the Author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In many ways, Afghanistan has served as a test case for the
international community's ability to promote the establishment of
democratic structures in a particular risk-state. As an extension of
the discourse on "humanitarian intervention" and inspired by the
assumption that non-democratic regimes and collapsed states pose a
threat to international peace by providing a breeding ground for
international
terrorism,
multilateral
and
even
unilateral
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interventionism in the name of democracy is increasingly eroding the
opacity of state sovereignty.' Regime-change through the use of force
2
is becoming a legitimate, though not necessarily legally justified
means of ensuring that democratic principles are either upheld or
introduced in a given state at risk. With regard to the latter, the
assumption is that democratic structures will ultimately serve
international peace and stability by fostering human development
and conflict prevention. 3 Thus, peace-building has become a matter of
state-building with international institutions, such as the United
Nations and its various agencies promoting the establishment of
democratic institutions as the basis for "good governance. ''4 In either
directly assuming functions of territorial administration or
supporting transitional authorities in establishing participatory
structures of governance, 5 the United Nations has become an "active
participant in managing profound social and political transformations
within sovereign states," 6 exposing itself to the risks of "social
engineering" by transplanting "western models of social, political and
economic organization into war shattered states. ' 7 Contrary to the

1.
See e.g., Peter Hilpold, The Continuing Modernity of Article 2(4) of the UN
Charter, in FESTSCHRIFT RUDOLF PALME 281, 284 (Ingenhaeff et al. eds., 2002)
(discussing the concept of humanitarian intervention and its facets in international
law).
2.
See U.N. High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, Report: A
More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,
164, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Nov. 29,
2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/ (discussing the distinction between
legality and legitimacy in relation to the prohibition of the use of force under Art. 2 (4)
of the U.N. Charter); see also Antonio Cassese, The Statute of the International
Criminal Court: Some PreliminaryReflections, 10 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 23 (1999); Bruno
Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 1, 1
(1999).
3.
Cf. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME [UNDP], HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
REPORT 2002: DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN A FRAGMENTED WORLD (2002).
4.
Ian Johnstone, U.S.-U.N. Relations after Iraq: The End of the World (Order)
As We Know It?, 15 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 813, 823 (2004).
5.
See e.g., Simon Chesterman, Transitional Administration, State-Building
and the U.N., in MAKING STATES WORK 339, 340 (Simon Chesterman et. al. eds., 2005)
(discussing the role of the U.N. in transitional administration) [hereinafter MAKING
STATES WORK]; see also BRUNO SIMMA,

ET AL.,

THE CHARTER OF THE U.N.: A

COMMENTARY 664-80 (2d ed. 2002) (providing an overview of the history of U.N.
peacekeeping) [hereinafter U.N. CHARTER COMMENTARY]; U.N. Gen. Assembly Sec.
Council, Report of the Panel on U.N. Peace Operations,
76-83, U.N. Doc. A/55/305S/2000/809 (Aug. 21, 2000) (prepared by Lakhdar Brahimi) [hereinafter Brahimi
Report]; Michael J. Matheson, U.N. Governance of Post-conflict Societies, 95 AM. J.
INT'L L. 76 (2001).
6.
Johnstone, supra note 4, at 823.
7.
Roland Paris, Peacebuilding and the Limits of Liberal Internationalism,
22:2 INT'L SEC. 54, 82 (1997); see Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development,
Legality and the Transplant Effect (Ctr. For Int'l Dev. At Harvard Univ. Working
Papers, CID No. 39, 2000) (providing an interesting survey and analysis of legal
transplants).
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cases of Kosovo and East Timor, however, the United Nations in
Afghanistan has, under the charismatic leadership of the Special
Representative of the Secretary General, Lakhdar Brahimi, 8 followed
a "light footed" approach, limiting its mandate to providing assistance
to the transitional authority. 9 This approach, though often criticized
for being entirely rhetorical and inadequate, 10 builds on the
assumption that the role of the United Nations should be limited to
that of partner, rather than sovereign administrator, to facilitate
state-building "owned" by the national authorities.' 1 Inherently an
exit strategy, the light footed approach seeks to limit the level of
dependency created by the assumption of direct executive functions so
the departure of the United Nations will not result in a reversal of
reforms undertaken.
Since December 2001, the United Nations, in conjunction with
bilateral initiatives, worked towards the establishment of democratic
institutions in post-Taliban Afghanistan. Under the mandate of the
"Bonn Agreement,"'12 and the recently adopted Afghanistan
Compact, 13 the United Nations has supported the implementation of

8.
Lakhdar Brahimi served as Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral from 2001 to 2004, biography available at http://www.un.org/News/dhliraq/
brahimi-bio-jan04.htm. Since 2004, the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan is
headed by Jean Arnault, biography available at U.N. Information Service, Jean
Arnault Appointed Special Representative of Secretary-General for Afghanistan and
Head of U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis
pressrels/2004/ sga865.html.
9.
See S.C. Res. 1401,
1, U.N. Doc. 5/RES/1401 (Mar. 28, 2002) (regarding
the establishment of a "U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan") (emphasis added by
the Author); The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on the Situation in
Afghanistan and its Implications for InternationalPeace and Security,
94-98, U.N.
Doc. A/561875-S/2002/278 (Mar. 18, 2002) [hereinafter 2002 Report of the SecretaryGeneral].
10.
See Chesterman, supra note 5, at 344 (providing a critique of the "light
footed" approach and the axiom of'national ownership).
11.
2002 Report of the Secretary-General,supra note 9, 98(b), (d).
The overall objective of UNAMA should be to provide support for the
implementation of the Bonn Agreement processes, including the stabilization of
the emerging structures of the Afghan Interim Authority, while recognizing
that the responsibility for the Agreement's implementation ultimately rests
with the Afghans themselves ....UNAMA should aim to bolster Afghan
capacity (both official and non-governmental), relying on as limited an
international presence and on as many Afghan staff as possible, and using
common support services where possible, thereby leaving a light expatriate
'footprint'.
12.
Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the ReEstablishment of Permanent Government Institutions, Bonn, F.R.G., (Dec. 5, 2001),
available at http://www.afghangovernment.com/AfghanAgreementBonn.htm [hereinafter
Bonn Agreement]; see also S.C. Res. 1383,
1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1383 (Dec. 6, 2001)
(endorsing the Bonn Agreement).
13.
The Afghanistan Compact, adopted at the London Conference on
Afghanistan, Jan. 31-Feb. 1, 2006, Annex to the Letter dated Feb. 9, 2006, from the
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the roadmap for the establishment of the interim administration and
the introduction of constitutional as well as legislative reforms
necessary for the functioning of a democratic state. As noted in the
recently released National Human Development Report,
the process envisaged in Bonn was built on the international
community's assumption that a democratic and representative state
would allow Afghans to exit the vicious cycle fuelled by a history of
internal armed conflict, natural disasters and underdevelopment, as
well as foster stability in the region, which would cut the roots of
14
terrorism.

To generate continuous donor support (i.e., bilateral and multilateral
funding), references to the need to build a democratic Afghanistan in
15
furtherance of international peace and stability are often made.
However, one should be cautious in viewing Afghanistan entirely
through a realist security paradigm because there is a risk of focusing
exclusively on specific security related issues, such as military
campaigns against the remnants of the Taliban and the security
sector reform, to the detriment of an overall human development
16
agenda.
While most would agree on the ultimate "vision" for Afghanistan,
namely the existence of a democratic state in which human
development can thrive, 17 the question of the means by which it can
be attained remains subject to contention. It is inherent in the United
Nations' mandate, particularly the requirement of consent by the
affected state in cases falling short of any Chapter VII enforcement
measures-that the international community adopt an institutional
approach to state-building ("top-down")-in the hope that services
provided by newly built or reformed institutions of governance will
eventually trickle down and generate the level of acceptance required
for a state structure to become effective. Such an approach, when

Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations addressed to the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/90.
14.
UNDP, AFGHANISTAN NATIONAL HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2004:
SECURITY WITH A HUMAN FACE 125-26 (2005) [hereinafter AFGHANISTAN NHDR].
15.
See e.g.,
GOVERNMENT/INTERNATIONAL
AGENCY REPORT, SECURING
AFGHANISTAN'S FUTURE: ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND THE STRATEGIC PATH FORWARD 8

(2004),
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Afghanistan/securing-afghanistanfuture-final.pdf (providing President Hamid Karzai's statement that "a stable
Afghanistan is a precondition for regional stability and global security").
16.
AFGHANISTAN NHDR, supra note 14, at 6 ("For too long, Afghanistan's
security problem has been interpreted narrowly as the security of the 'state' from
internal and external aggression, or as the protection of the interests of fragmented
groups claiming political legitimacy in the absence of a state, or from the position of
global and regional interests.").
17.
The contentious issue remaining is, to what extent traditionalism practiced
in most areas of the country on the basis of tribal "laws" can and should be reconciled
with (Western) modernism based on such a democratic vision.
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preached and practiced exclusively, no doubt merits substantial
criticism, particularly in the dimensions of the rule of law
paradigm.18 However, when it comes to laying the foundation of a
democratic state in a post-conflict context, such as Afghanistan, it
seems indispensable to focus first on re-creating an enabling political
environment, i.e., basic state structures and their underlying legal
framework (legislature, executive, and judiciary), for development
and stability to evolve. 19 In a way, this institutional approach is
premised on the assumption that feeding the chicken will ultimately
generate the eggs. For these democratic institutions to evolve on the
basis of certain democratic legal parameters, it is necessary to carve
out a formal framework that would function as the conceptual
20
foundation for all branches of government.
The basic legal framework of a modern democratic state is
promulgated by a constitution that serves as the basic law of the
state. In the aftermath of non-democratic regimes, the process of
constitution-making is as important as the product-the Constitution
itself. A Constitution that does not adequately reflect the will of the
majority and thus is not commonly accepted will suffer from a lack of
effectiveness that threatens to undermine the emergence of a culture
of constitutionalism. 2 1 Naturally, any attempt at constitution-making
will grapple with the tension between adopting a revolutionary or
evolutionary approach and always entails a considerable measure of
imposition by a minority-the drafters-on the majority the

18.
See Stephen Golub, Beyond the Rule of Law Orthodoxy: The Legal
Empowerment Alternative, 7-25 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Rule of Law
Series, Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Working Paper No. 41 Oct. 2003).
19.
See Hansjorg Strohmeyer, Collapse and Reconstruction of a Judicial
System: The U.N. Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 58 (2001)
(discussing the difficulties in establishing such a legal framework, particularly for the
administration of justice, in Kosovo and East Timor); see also Antonia Potter, The Rule
of Law as The Measure of Peace? Responsive Policy for ReconstructingJustice and the
Rule of Law in Post Conflict and Transitional Environments (Ctr. for Humanitarian
Dialogue, Paper for UNU-WIDER Conference on 'Making Peace Work', Helsinki, May
4-5, 2004) available at http://www.hdcentre.org; J. Alexander Thier, Re-establishing
the Judicial System in Afghanistan (Ctr. On Democracy, Dev. and the Rule of Law,
Working Paper No. 19, Sep. 1, 2004), http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/20714/
Reestablishing-the-Judiciary-in-Afghanistan.pdf.
20.
This is not to say that the formal framework will automatically lead to the
establishment of functioning democratic structures. In fact, there has traditionally
been a wide gap in Afghanistan between the formal (legal) framework as promulgated
by the Constitution and implementing laws on the one hand, and the (rural) reality on
the other.
Afghanistan's constitutions and laws have been notorious for their
inefficacy. Simultaneously, it should be borne in mind that Afghanistan had its own
formal structures even during the time of the Taliban regime. However, the point here
is that a formal framework is a precondition for any democratic state to evolve, without
being sufficient in itself.
21.
Cf. VIVIEN HART, UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE [USIP], SPECIAL
REPORT:

DEMOCRATIC

specialreports/srl07.pdf.

CONSTITUTION

MAKING

(2003),

http://www.usip.org/pubs/
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constituents. 22 The democratic deficit inherent in the selfappointment of a transitional authority mandated to re-institute
permanent state structures after civil war can only be overcome by
designing a process that sufficiently allows for the emergence of a
democratic dialogue and participation. Naturally, transitional
authorities, particularly those emanating from the victorious party of
an internal armed conflict, will be reluctant to cede powers and share
governmental authority with representatives from the defeated camp.
However, in circumstances such as the one prevailing in Afghanistan
in late 2001, where the international community or a few exponents
of "regime change" had effectuated the main thrust for the ousting of
the non-democratic regime, 23 it was feasible to gradually introduce
democratic processes to furnish the legitimacy of the future state and
In inducing democratic-i.e., participatoryits administration.
processes, the primary focus will be on the holding of presidential and
parliamentary elections and not necessarily on processes envisaged
for crafting a new constituticnal framework which is to provide the
legal terrain on which the elections can be held. However, public
participation in the building of the foundations of a democratic state
has been seen as a valid and effective means of furnishing an
emerging culture of democracy. 24 In fact, numerous claims were made
by national and international actors that the constitution-making
process needed to be as participatory as possible to safeguard the
legitimacy of the outcome, thus creating an environment for
democracy to thrive. 25 This becomes important in circumstances in
which military intervention-i.e., regime-change-was morally based
on the premise and promise that non-democratic structures needed to
be replaced by democracy in furtherance of the common good.
Accordingly, while focusing its initial assistance efforts on the
expedited creation of such a framework for Afghanistan, the
international community acknowledged the need for public
participation to safeguard some measure of common acceptance by
the people and hence the public as well as international legitimacy.
The constitution-making process in Afghanistan, however, has
not been immune from substantive criticism as to its lack of sufficient

22.
See Andrew Arato, Forms of Constitution Making and Theories of
Democracy, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 191 (1995).
Cf. Simon Chesterman, Humanitarian Intervention in Afghanistan, in
23.
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 163, 170 (Jennifer M.

Welsh ed., 2004).
24.
HART, supra note 21, at 11-12; Yash Ghai, A Journey Around
Constitutions: Reflecting on Contemporary Constitutions, 1, 20 (2005) (paper on file

with the Author).
See e.g., International Crisis Group [ICG], Afghanistan's Flawed
25.
Constitutional Process 27-29 (June 12, 2003), http://www.crisisweb.org/home/index.
cfm?id=1639&1=1.
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public dialogue and participation. 2 6 It may be tempting to compare
Afghanistan's constitution-making efforts with the simultaneous
drafting of a new Constitution for the European Union, which offered
far fewer opportunities for participation and remained the subject of
an exclusive circle.
A comparison, however, is improper.
In
Afghanistan, the international community's heavy attention and
involvement fueled the efforts by the national transitional authority
to strive for national as well as international legitimacy. Such a
balance is difficult to achieve, particularly in a context where various
ideological forces within a state are pulling into opposite directions of
modernism and traditionalism. The internationality of the process,
even though only accompanied by a "light footed" approach, had
visible implications, not only in terms of process, but also in
substance.
This Article to highlights some of these implications by
describing and analyzing the constitution-making process with a
particular focus on how it was linked to the international legal
framework. Apart from presenting the components of the process
itself, this Article analyzes the international community's impact on
the crafting of the constitution. Based on the understanding of the
interaction between national state-building and international
benchmarks, this Article evaluates how the recently adopted
constitution links to the international legal framework and argues
that the constitution, while paying lip-service to the adherence of
international human rights law, does not adequately address the
relationship between international legal obligations and municipal
law. This Article will argue that the failure to adopt a specific
mechanism to effectuate international law within the internal legal
system may work against efforts by the international community to
facilitate strong links to the international normative regime and its
human rights standards in the new democratic state. The vagueness
of the Constitution with respect to Afghanistan's international legal
obligations in combination with the prevalence of Islamic principles
may obviate the progressive features that the constitutional framers
agreed upon in early-January 2004.

II.

THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE REBUILDING OF
AFGHANISTAN (THE "BONN PROCESS")

The war against terrorism in Afghanistan had barely begun
when the U.N.-brokered talks in Bonn in early-December 2001 led to

26.
E.g. id.; see also ICG, Afghanistan: The ConstitutionalLoya Jirga 1-2 (Dec.
12, 2003), http://www.crisisweb.orghome/index.cfm?id=2417&1=1.
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the "Bonn Agreement," 2 7 which was to set the roadmap for
Afghanistan's transition from collapsed state to democracy. While
suffering from a lack of proper representation, 28 the agreement
envisaged specific processes by which democratic institutions of
governance were to be established in a country which had witnessed
decades of occupation and civil war. 29 Ambitious in its timeline, the
Preamble recognizes "the need to ensure broad representation in
these interim arrangements of all segments of the Afghan population,
including groups that have not been adequately represented at the
U.N. Talks on Afghanistan" and noted that "these interim
arrangements are intended as a first step toward the establishment
of a broad-based, gender-sensitive,
multi-ethnic and fully
representative government, and are not intended to remain in place
beyond a specified period of time. '30 In essence, the Bonn Agreement
foresaw that under the guidance and scrutiny of the international
community, a non-representative elite would follow the process
agreed upon to eventually cede interim authority to the
democratically established institutions. Naturally, such an approach
in itself bears considerable risks depending on the benevolence of the
non-representative
interim authority. However, taking into
consideration the international military attention Afghanistan had
received a few weeks prior to Bonn and the apparent commitment of
31
the international community to effectuate a lasting regime-change,
there was considerable military and financial leverage to initiate (if
not impose) a process that would lead to the replacement of the
interim authority by governmental institutions accountable to the
people. The Bonn Agreement makes ample reference to the role of the
United Nations "as the internationally recognized impartial
institution," that would have a "particularly important role to
play ...in the period prior to the establishment of permanent
institutions in Afghanistan. '32 It must be emphasized, however, that
the degree to which the United Nations was to assume direct

27.
Bonn Agreement, supra note 12; see Ebrahim Afsah & Alexandria Ghur,
Afghanistan: Building a State to keep the Peace, in 9 MAX PLANK U.N.Y.B. 373, 410-16
(2005) (discussing the negotiations in Bonn).
28.
Barnett R. Rubin,
DEMOCRACY 5, 7 (2004).

Crafting a

Constitution For Afghanistan,

15

J.

29.
See Afsah & Ghur, supra note 27, at 384 (noting that the focus of the Bonn
Agreement is to create a process instead of a formal agreement over substantive
issues).
30.
Bonn Agreement, supra note 12, pmbl.
31.
Strictly speaking, the removal of the internationally non-recognized
Taliban regime was not a case of regime change, as it co-existed next to the
internationally recognized Islamic State of Afghanistan headed by Professor Rabbani
and the legitimate representative at the United Nations.
32.
Bonn Agreement, supra note 12, pmbl., annexes I-Ill (providing for specific
roles of the United Nations in the state-building processes envisaged therein).
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responsibilities for the state-building process was deliberately limited
to the so-called "light-foot" approach. 33 Drawing upon the experiences
in Kosovo and East Timor, 34 the approach largely focused on assisting
the national authorities, the interim and transitional government, in
the implementation of the Bonn Agreement, 35 with the latter to
retain overall political accountability and control, at least in theory.
The model of such partnership between a recently instituted
transitional authority and the United Nations to bring about the
realization of the state-building process according to previously
defined benchmarks agreed upon a few days after a military
36
intervention marked an evolution of U.N. peace-building.
Viewed from the international law perspective, the Bonn
Agreement escapes traditional distinctions between domestic
agreements and international treaties. Nor is it a peace-treaty
concluded between various factions of a civil war, which may enjoy
international legal personality and thus limit treaty-making capacity
even though technically defined as insurgents. 37 It is tempting to
question how the so-called "participants in the UN Talks on
Afghanistan, '38 who were mostly representatives of the Northern
Alliance forces fighting alongside the Coalition Forces next to
delegations from Cyprus, Rome, and the Peshawar Loya Jirga
processes, 39 could enter into an agreement that arguably created
rights and obligations for the United Nations, which was only a
witness to the agreement. 40 That raises the crucial issue of the

33.
2002 Report of the Secretary-General,supra note 9, 98(d).
34.
Brahimi Report, supra note 5, at 3; Daniel Fitzpatrick, Developing a Legal
System in East Timor: Some Issues of U.N. Mandate and Capacity, 5 AUSTL. REV. INT'L
& EUR. L. [ARIEL] 5 (2000).
35.
See Bonn Agreement, supra note 12, annex III,
3-4 (noting, however,
that in Annex III of the Agreement, the Bonn participants requested that the United
Nations conduct the registration of voters for general elections and a census of the
population of Afghanistan).
36.
Thilo Marauhn, Konfliktfolgenbewdltigung in Afghanistan zwischen Utopie
und
Pragmatismus:
Die
vdlkerrechtlichen
Rahmenbedingungen
der
Ubergangsverwaltung,40 ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS (AVR) 480, 507 (2002); see also
Chesterman, supra note 5, at 339, 341.
37.
Cf. Michael Schoiswohl, Status and (Human Rights) Obligations of NonRecognized De Facto Regimes in InternationalLaw: The Case of 'Somaliland,' 221-22
(2004); Michael Schoiswohl, De Facto-Regimes and Human Rights Obligations-The
Twilight Zone of Public InternationalLaw, 6 AUSTL. REV. INT'L & EUR. L. (ARIEL) 45
(2001).
38.
Bonn Agreement, supra note 12, pmbl.
39.
Rubin, supra note 28, at 5-6, 8; Helena Malikyar & Barnett R. Rubin,
Center-periphery Relations in the Afghan State: Current Practices, Future Prospects
(Ctr. On Int'l Cooperation, New York Univ., Dec. 2002), http://www.cic.nyu.edu/archive/
pdf/CPReport010703l.pdf, [hereinafter Center-Periphery].
40.
After the list of signatories the Bonn Agreement makes reference to
"Witnessed for the U.N. by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Representative of the
Secretary-General for Afghanistan." See Bonn Agreement, supra note 12. It is also
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capacity in which the participants to the U.N. talks on Afghanistan
were actually acting. Were they acting as internationally recognized
and thus legitimate representatives of Afghanistan or as a
continuation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan under Professor
Rabbani, the Head of the Islamic State of Afghanistan since 1992? Or
were they merely recognized as a group of individuals, who enjoyed
the military power and international support to form a government,
which, upon its formal inauguration, would become the legitimate,
internationally recognized, government of that state? On its face, the
Bonn Agreement would seem to imply the latter understanding by
stipulating that "upon the official transfer of power, the Interim
Authority shall be the repository of Afghan sovereignty" which shall
''represent Afghanistan in its external relations and shall occupy the
seat of Afghanistan at the U.N. and in its specialized agencies, as
'4 1
well as in other international institutions and conferences.
In the absence of any clear legal categorization of the Bonn
Agreement under international law, attempts were made to apply the
theory of self-determination to elevate the Agreement to the level of
other international agreements. The argument put forth in this
regard hinges upon the presumption that the groups participating in
the talks acted as representatives of various ethnic groups and thus
were temporarily and collectively exercising the right to selfdetermination on behalf of the Afghan population. 42 However, such a
legal interpretation of the Bonn Agreement as a treaty under
international law is impaired by the fact, acknowledged by the
43
Agreement itself, that not all groups were adequately represented.
Analogies to cases where de facto governments were held to possess
treaty-making capacity,
such as the Palestine Liberation
Organization, fail to recognize the factual circumstances underlying
the Bonn Agreement, most importantly the fact that the
representatives of the various ethnic groups did not purport to
exercise any right to self-determination on behalf of their
constituencies. Nor were they internationally recognized as a

noteworthy that the Bonn Agreement, according to its final provisions, is to be
deposited in the archives of the United Nations. See id.
41.
Id., § I, 3.
42.
Marauhn, supra note 36, at 491.
It should be noted that Professor
Marauhn's reading of the Bonn Agreement as explicitly entrusting the interim
authority with the function to act as the "repository of the Afghan right to selfdetermination" does not correspond to the wording of the pertinent provision in the
Agreement. See id. (emphasis added). In fact, the Agreement in regard of the Interim
Authority speaks of "repository of Afghan sovereignty" while not mentioning the right
to self-determination throughout all provisions. See Bonn Agreement, supra note 12,
§ I, 3.
43.
Bonn Agreement, supra note 12, pmbl.; see also Rubin, supra note 28, at 5,
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collective representation of the Afghan people. To the contrary, as
stipulated in the Bonn Agreement, it was understood that full
representation had yet to be achieved. 44 However, even if one were to
qualify the participants to the Bonn talks as 'collective repository of
the Afghan right to self-determination' it still remained doubtful that
the agreement could be interpreted as one being entered into between
two or more subjects of international law. 45 After all, the United
Nations signed the Bonn Agreement only as witness and not as a
party. 46 It follows that one would have to qualify each of the signing
parties to the Agreement as subjects of international law, which
would contradict the assumption of a collective exercise of selfdetermination vis-A-vis the United Nations While the contents of the
Bonn Agreement could arguably be understood as a direct invocation
of the right to internal self-determination-the peoples' right to
assert their will, to choose a government, and be represented 47-it is

44.
The terms of the Bonn Agreement, in particular its Preamble, would seem
to aim at laying the foundation for full representation to be achieved by the processes
envisaged for the building of democratic state institutions. The Agreement notes the
"need to ensure broad representation in these interim arrangements or all segments of
the Afghan population, including groups that have not been adequately represented at
the UN Talks on Afghanistan," and also notes that the interim arrangements are
"intended as a first step towards the establishment of a broad-based, gender sensitive,
multi-ethnic and fully representative government." See Bonn Agreement, supra note
12, pmbl.
45.
The (authoritative) 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
stipulates that it applies to treaties between states (Art. 1), while acknowledging in
Article 3, that this exclusion shall not affect the legal force as well as the application of
the rules set out in the Convention with respect to international agreements concluded
between states and other subjects of international law. See Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 333-34; 8 I.L.M. 679 (entered into
force Jan. 27, 1980). [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
46.
One scholar, stating that a copy "shall remain deposited in the archives of
the U.N.," argues that the final provision of the Bonn Agreement may be cited in
support of the Agreement's qualification as a treaty under international law by
insinuating that the provisions of Article 102 of the U.N. Charter may be applied
flexibly. See Marauhn, supra note 36, at 493 n.65. However, in the view of the Author,
such an interpretation not only stretches the terms used in Article 102, para. 1, which
refers to "treaty and international agreements entered into by any Member of the
U.N.... shall as soon as possible be registered with the Secretariat," too far but also
overlooks that the Bonn Agreement merely calls for being "deposited" and not
registered and published as required by Art. 102. Id.; see Bonn Agreement, supra note
12, § V.
47.

ANTONIO

CASSESE,

SELF-DETERMINATION

OF

PEOPLES:

A

LEGAL

REAPPRAISAL 101 (1995) (defining self-determination as "the right to authentic selfgovernment, that is, the right for a people really and freely to choose its own political
and economic regime ....
It is an ongoing right"). However, the exact specifications of
a right to internal self-determination, in particular, whether or not it includes a right
to democratic governance and ultimately a right to autonomy, unfortunately seem to
remain rather in the dark, largely as a result of ongoing development. See U.N.
CHARTER COMMENTARY, supra note 5, at 56; Felix Ermacora, Autonomie als innere
Selbstbestimmung, 38 ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS (AVR) 285, 289 (2000); Daniel
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presumably safe to speculate that the Bonn Agreement does not
qualify as an agreement that is enforceable under international law
and that those provisions that relate to the United Nations should be
interpreted as a declaration concerning the latter's mandate in the
political reconstruction of Afghanistan. This view is confirmed by the
conduct of the U.N. Security Council, which endorsed the Bonn
Agreement with a U.N. Security Council Resolution. 48 Such a
resolution would not have been necessary if the Bonn Agreement
were to be read as an international agreement between the United
Nations and "Afghanistan" represented by the participants to the
Bonn talks. 49 Though the Security Council adopted the same
mechanism, the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement for the conflict in
Bosnia-Herzegovina qualified as an inter-state agreement, given the
parties involved represented state entities, namely Bosnia
50
Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia.
While these issues undoubtedly merit closer scrutiny, they are
beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to
observe that the democratic legitimacy of the participants vis-a-vis
the Afghan constituency, and thus the democratic legitimacy of the
agreement as such, remains an unresolved matter. This amply
demonstrates the difficulties attached to building a democratic state
on the fragments of war, in a context where legitimacy is to be
generated on the basis of a non-representative transitional de facto
authority. One may further be tempted to conclude that the building
blocks for democracy after a regime change effectuated with the
military support of the international community, or at least one of its
strongest representatives, will inescapably and inherently be nondemocratic.
The building-blocks for democratic reform are spelled out in the
Bonn Agreement. It envisages the establishment of an Interim
Authority consisting of the Interim Administration, a Special
Independent Commission for the Convening of the Emergency Loya
Jirga,5 1 and a Supreme Court of Afghanistan, as well as any other

Thiirer, Das Selbstbestimmungsrechtder V6lker, 22 ARCHIV DES VOLKERRECHTS (AVR)
113, 126 (1984);.
48.
See S.C. Res. 1383, 1, U.N. Doc. S[RES/1383 (Dec. 6, 2001).
49.
This is not to understate the importance of the U.N. Security Council
endorsement in reinforcing the adherence by all parties involved in the Bonn talks to
the compromises reflected in the Bonn Agreement as well as in facilitating reform.
50.
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Dec.
14, 1995, 35 I.L.M 75, 77.
51.
A Loya Jirga represents the traditional consultative mechanism in Afghan
community affairs. Loya Jirgas, which essentially are composed of community leaders
with high (political) standing, have formed an important mechanism in the political
developments of Afghanistan in the past, such as the adoption of previous constitutions
and resolutions of matters of fundamental interest to the state. See Christine Noelle-
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courts as may be established by the Interim Administration. 52 The
Emergency Loya Jirga was then, according to the terms of the
Agreement, to "decide on a Transitional Authority, including a broadbased transitional administration to lead Afghanistan until such time
as a fully representative government can be elected through free and
fair elections. . . -63 To lay the necessary legal framework of the
future State of Afghanistan in general and for the holding of
Presidential and Parliamentary elections in particular, the Bonn
Agreement provides for a process by which Afghanistan's new
constitution was to be developed and adopted. Again, it draws upon
the concept of Loya Jirgato root the state-building exercise in Afghan
traditions 54 to furnish the democratization process with a measure of
participation in furtherance of generating legitimacy. Assisted by the
United Nations, a Constitutional Commission was to be established
which would prepare the convening of the Constitutional Loya Jirga
within eighteen months of the establishment of the Transitional
55
Authority, to adopt a new constitution for Afghanistan.
III. OVERVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS IN
AFGHANISTAN UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Under the aegis of the transitional administration indirectly
elected by the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002 and headed by
Hamid Karzai as the President of the Transitional Islamic State of
Afghanistan, 56 the preparations for the drafting of a new constitution
commenced with the establishment of the Constitutional Drafting
Commission in October 2002.57 The nine members of the Drafting
Commission, supported by a Secretariat and the United Nations,
were not to develop a comprehensive Draft Constitution, but rather to
produce recommendations for the President of the Islamic
Transitional State of Afghanistan, so as to form of the first consensus
on key constitutional issues with the involvement of Pushtun
representation, including influential returnees. They produced a first
text based on the 1964 Constitution,5" which the Bonn Agreement

Karimi, The Loya Jirga: An Effective Political Tool? A Historical Overview, in
AFGHANISTAN: A COUNTRY WITHOUT A STATE? 37 (Christine Noelle-Karimi et al. eds.,
2002); Rubin, supra note 28, at 7; Ali Wardak, Building A Post-War Justice System In
Afghanistan, 41 CRIME L. & Soc. CHANGE 319, 326-28 (2004).
52.
Bonn Agreement, supra note 12, § I,
2.
53.
Id. §I, 4.
54.
See Noelle-Karimi, supra note 51, at 37.
55.
Bonn Agreement, supra note 12, § I, 6.
56.
See Rubin, supra note 28, at 9 (discussing the Emergency Loya Jirga).
57.
The Constitutional Drafting Commission was inaugurated by King Zahir
Shah in his capacity as "Father of the Nation." See infra Part IV.1.
59.
Rubin, supra note 28, at 10.
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had largely revived as the transitional constitutional framework to
the extent that its provisions were not inconsistent with those in the
Agreement and with the exception of those provisions relating to the
monarchy. 60 The recommendations on the content as well as format of
the constitution were presented to the transitional President in
March 2003, which paved the way for the appointment of the
Constitutional Review Commission in April 2003. The thirty-five
members of the Review Commission-including seven women-were
chosen to represent the country's diverse regional and ethnic
composition and to satisfy the political, constitutional, economic,
social, and religious requirements necessary for general acceptance
by the population. To facilitate a constitutional dialogue with the
Afghan constituencies, a public consultation process was launched in
May 2003 accompanied by various efforts towards public
information. 63 In total, more than 460,000 questionnaires were
distributed by the Secretariat of the Commission out of which 80,000
completed questionnaires were received along with numerous
memoranda and other recommendations. 64 In addition, the members
of the Review Commission attended more than five-hundred public
consultation meetings held in all thirty-two provinces of Afghanistan
as well as refugee groups in Iran and Pakistan. These completed
questionnaires along with the views expressed by the people in the
course of the public consultation meetings were recorded by the
Secretariat and, with the support of the United Nations, compiled in
the Public Consultation Report on the basis of which the members of
the Constitutional Review Commission prepared the Draft
Constitution. The President released the Draft Constitution to the
public on November 3, 2003.67
In anticipation of the Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) itself and
6s
based on the procedure decreed by President Hamid Karzai,
provincial registration meetings were conducted in thirty-two
provinces to register the Emergency Loya Jirga district

60.
Bonn Agreement, supra note 12, § II, 1.
63.
Rauf Roashan, Afghan Constitution Building Exercise: Taking the Case to
the People (2003), http://www.cic.nyu.edu/archive/pdf/TakingtheCasetothePeople.pdf.
64.
UNDP, SUPPORT TO THE CONSTITUTION-MAKING PROCESS IN AFGHANISTAN:
FINAL REPORT (2002-2004), at 15 (2005).

67.
Rubin, supra note 28, at 10.
68.
Decree of the President of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan on
the Convening of the Constitutional Loya Jirga, No.24.04.1382 (July 15, 2003) (Afg.)
[hereinafter Decree].
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representatives who formed the electorate for the 344 CLJ delegates
in early December. The elections for the 106 representatives of the socalled "Special Category Groups"-women, refugees in Pakistan and
Iran, internally displaced peoples, Kuchis, Hindus, and Sikhs-took
place throughout the month of November. 69 In preparation for the
CLJ, the Secretariat of the Constitutional Commission with the
support of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the U.N.
Development Programme, organized and conducted general
orientation meetings and sessions for the incoming delegates and
special training and orientation for female delegates based on a
manual developed by the working group of the Ministry of Women's
Affairs.
As envisaged in the Bonn Agreement-and still within the
timeframe called for therein-the CLJ Convention convened on
December 14, 2003, and after lengthy stalemates, adopted the
Constitution by consensus on January 3, 2004.70 The President
officially proclaimed the Constitution on January 26, 2004.71

IV.

THE MAIN FEATURES OF THE 2004 CONSTITUTION

A. Background
As any other constitution, Afghanistan's basic law adopted on
January 3, 2004, cannot be fully understood without reference to
Afghanistan's socio-political history and context. 72 Most important,
the population of Afghanistan consists of various ethnic groups,
reflecting the geopolitical influence of its neighboring states of Iran,
Pakistan, China, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Its society is
characterized as multi-ethnic, with the Pushtuns claiming to
represent the majority, followed the Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras,
Turkmens, Baluchs, and Nuristanis, to name but the most common
groups existing in Afghanistan today. 73 While the extent to which
ethnic fragmentation and domination have played a role in
Afghanistan's struggle for stability and peace remains a matter of
controversy, 74 the debate over how to constitute the Afghan state was

69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. art. 5.
Rubin, supra note 28, at 5.
Id.
With regard to the history and fabric of Afghan society, see e.g., RALPH H.

MAGNUS & EDEN NABY, AFGHANISTAN: MULLAH, MARX AND MUJAHID (rev. & updated
ed. 2002); CHRIS JOHNSON ET AL., OVERSEAS DEV. INST., AFGHANISTAN'S POLITICAL AND

CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 4-5 (2003), available at http://www.odi.org.ukhpg;
Malikyar & Rubin, supra note 39, at 4.
73.

MAGNUS & NABY, supra note 72, at 11.

74.
AFGHANISTAN NHDR, supra note 14, at 100; Afsah & Guhr, supra note 27,
at 378-82.
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heavily influenced by ethnic politics: "Pushtuns have tended to want
a strong and Pushtun-run central state. Tajiks have focused on power
sharing in the central state, while Uzbeks and Hazaras have desired
recognition of their identities and mechanisms of local selfgovernment. '75 Moreover, the main ethnic groups were divided along
those who advocated centralized reforms to counteract the warlords
that had evolved as a result of foreign intervention, 76 and those who
rejected a centralized system as a pretext for the Pushtun's
reassertion of power and demanded the institution of a strong
National Assembly (as well as a Prime-Minister) to curtail the power
of the President, who, as most of the CLJ delegates took for granted,
would continue to be Hamid Karzai. There were also those who
sought the reinstitution of a constitutional monarchy which governed
in a period of relative stability and peace under the reign of King
Zahir Shah (1933-1973). Many Afghans considered the aging King,
who had returned from his exile in Rome after the defeat of the
Taliban, as the sole unifying figure to re-introduce a measure of
stability after the years of internal conflict. However, the former
King-officially named the "Father of the Nation" at the Emergency
Loya Jirga and affirmed as such by Article 158 of the 2004
Constitution-had rejected the restoration of monarchy well before
the convening of the CLJ.7 7 Finally, while adherence to Islam as the
religion of Afghanistan was never disputed, significant controversy
emerged between those who advocated for the secularization of the
State and those who insisted on the primacy of Islam to be upheld by
the Supreme Court acting as a constitutional watchdog. These
predispositions, which to varying degrees had also been articulated
by the public, shaped the debate over key provisions of the
Constitution to be adopted by the 502 CLJ delegates, who early into
the Convention formed various alliances accordingly within the CLJ,
resulting in cumbersome stalemates and daily stand-offs. The
significant ethnic divide that surfaced at the CLJ escalated around
the issues of parliamentarism versus presidentialism, official
languages of the state, reformism or secularization versus

75.
76.

Rubin, supra note 28, at 11.
See Antonio Giustozzi, Respectable Warlords? The Transition from War of

All Against All to Peaceful Competition in Afghanistan (Jan. 29, 2003),
http://www.crisisstates.com/download/others/SeminarAG29012003.pdf (discussing the
"phenomenon" of warlordism in Afghanistan)
77.
See CTR. INT'L COOPERATION (N.Y.U.), AFGHANISTAN: TOWARDS A NEW
CONSTITUTION 2 (2003) [hereinafter NEW CONSTITUTION]. It should be noted that the

King was prevented from standing for office at the Emergency Loya Jirga, which had
outraged many among the Afghan population. See JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 72, at 6.
79.
See e.g., Id.; NEW CONSTITUTION, supra note 77; ActionAid, What Poor
Afghans Think: The New Afghanistan Constitution: A Need for Consultation and

Participation(2003), http://www.actionaid.org.uk/_content/ documents/af survey.pdf.
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traditionalism, and centralism versus de-centralization. While
difficult to measure, there is reason to assume that the heavy
involvement of the international community, along with the broad
media exposure of the constitution-making process, particularly the
CLJ, significantly contributed to, if not determined, the compromises
reflected in the Constitution. The international community influenced
the constitution-making process not only through the United Nations,
which worked closely with the Afghan authorities in the
constitutional design and monitored the process intensively, but also
bilaterally through the representations of the United States and the
European Union in Kabul. In addition, internationally renowned
scholars, national and international NGOs, and think tanks provided
support to the Constitutional Commission and the Loya Jirga
delegates in formulating various options based on comparative
research and surveys with regard to the main features of the
79
Constitution.
B. The 2004 Constitution-ABrief Overview and Discussion of its
Main Features
To a large extent, the 2004 Constitution is a mirror of the 1964
Constitution, which had been praised as liberal and relatively
progressive, particularly in view of the priority it gave to
parliamentary legislation over Islamic law.80 However, apart from
abandoning the model of constitutional monarchy envisaged in
Article 1 of the 1964 Constitution, the 2004 Constitution departs
significantly from its early predecessor in contentious areas, such as
the relationship between Islam and statutory law, and the structure
of government.
1. The Role of Islam and Constitutional Review
According to the letter of the Constitution, Afghanistan is an
"Islamic Republic" with "the sacred religion of Islam" being the
religion of the state.8 1 Crucially, Article 3, which had been the subject
of intense debates during the drafting and adoption process, provides
that "[n]o law shall contravene the tenets and provisions of the holy
religion of Islam in Afghanistan." Initially, the October 2003 Draft
Constitution had envisaged that "no law can be contrary to the sacred

80.

ICG, supra note 25, at 5. The text of the 1964 Constitution is reprinted in

AFG., THE CONSTITUTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN: 1923-1996, (2004).
81.

CONSTITUTION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN arts. 1-2 (2004),

adopted Jan. 3, 2004, available at www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl [hereinafter AFG. CONST.
(2004)].
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religion of Islam and the values of this Constitution.'8 2 A proposal had
been made, supported by 105 CLJ delegates, to revise the language to
"no law can be against the beliefs and provisions of the holy religion
of Islam," and the Reconciliation Committee--consisting of the CLJ
Chairs and the Chairpersons of the ten Working Committeesadopted the proposed change. While the variances seem nominal,
they reflect the compromise reached in satisfying the demands of
conservative Islamists and the international community, which
insisted that reference to Islamic law (shari'a)be omitted from the
text. Moreover, contrary to previous constitutions,8 3 Article 3 does not
specify one particular school of shari'a, such as the Hanafi or Shia
jurisprudence.8 4 As will be discussed in more detail below,8 5 the
formulation in Article 3 is considerably flexible and vague, bearing
witness to the negotiations that ultimately led to its adoption. The
potential for legal complexity arises in the context of international
human rights standards, which may be seen as conflicting with the
tenets of Islam. The matter is particularly sensitive in view of the
Constitution's lip-service to international human rights standards
(Article 7) on the one hand, and the Supreme Court's authority to
.review the laws, legislative decrees, international treaties as well as
international covenants for their compliance with the Constitution
and their interpretation in accordance with the law" spelled out in
Article 121 of the 2004 Constitution on the other.8 6 The review
authority of the Supreme Court coupled with the primacy of Islam
enshrined in Article 3 offers a backdoor through which the
commitment to international human rights standards is potentially

82.
Draft Const. of Afg. art. 3 (Oct. 2003) [hereinafter Draft Const.], available
at www.constitution-afg.com (emphasis added).
83.
Article 2 of the 1964 Afghan Constitution stipulated that, "Religious rites
performed by the State shall be according to the provisions of the Hanafi doctrine."
CONSTITUTION OF THE IsLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN art. 2 (1964) [hereinafter
AFG.CONST. (1964)]; see THE CONSTITUTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 80.

84.

Cf. Rubin, supra note 28, at 13; see also Said Amir Arjomand, The Role of

Religion and the Hanafi and Ja'fari Jurisprudence in the New Constitution of
Afghanistan, in NEW CONSTITUTION, supra note 77, at 18; JOHNSON ET AL., supra note

72, at 18. It should be noted, however, that the most recent Constitution contains
references to both schools of thought, with an arguable preference for the former, when
addressing the sources of law to be applied by courts. In Article 130 it states that, "the
courts shall apply provisions of this Constitution as well as other laws. If there is no
provision in the Constitution or other laws about a case, the court shall, in pursuance
of Hanafi jurisprudence, and, within the limits set by this Constitution, rule in a way
that attains justice in the best manner." AFG. CONST. art. 130 (2004). On the other
hand, Article 131 provides that "the courts shall apply the Shia jurisprudence in cases
involving personal matters of followers of the Shia sect in accordance with the
provisions of the law. In other cases, if no clarification in this Constitution and other
laws exist, the courts shall rule according to laws of this sect." Id. art. 131.
85.
86.

See infra Part V.2.
AFG. CONST. art. 121 (2004) (emphasis added by the Author).
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undermined.8 7 To avoid an inherently conservative interpretation of
Article 3 and role of Islam in relation to statutory law by the
Supreme Court, proposals had been made during the drafting and
88
adoption stage to establish some kind of Constitutional Court.
However, the idea of a Constitutional Court next to the Supreme
Court did not find sufficient support within the Loya Jirga and was
firmly rejected by the President's office. 8 9 Instead, an "Independent
Commission for the supervision of the implementation of the
Constitution" (Article 157) was established. 90 In the absence of any
powers granted by the Constitution and the Supreme Court's
prerogative to constitutional review, it remains doubtful that the
Commission will have any significant role to play in being the
guardian of constitutionality.
2. A Strong President
Another striking feature of the 2004 Constitution, which had
been the subject of contentious debate, is the role of the President visA-vis the Parliament. 91 Initially, the Constitutional Commission had
proposed a semi-presidential system, a President and Prime Minister,
to furnish an ethnic equilibrium by balancing a Pushtun President
with a non-Pushtun Prime Minister, the latter being subject to a
confidence vote by the National Assembly. In the review stage prior to
the CLJ, however, the confidence vote requirement had been dropped,
resulting in a Prime Minister being solely appointed by the President
while being subject to a vote of no-confidence by the National
Assembly.
The semi-presidential system was finally abandoned entirely in
the Draft Constitution announced by President Karzai in November
2003, giving rise to a full presidential system. 92 The CLJ finally

87.
A key factor in this regard is the composition of the Supreme Court, which
usually is comprised of Islamic scholars (ulamas) with little background in statutory
(constitutional) law.
88.
Cf. Donald L. Horowitz, Constitutional Courts: Opportunities and Pitfalls,
in NEW CONSTITUTION, supra note 77; Herman Schwartz, A Constitutional Court for

Afghanistan, in NEW CONSTITUTION, supra note 77, at 119; Said Amir Arjomand & Kim
Lane Scheppele, Constitutional Court for Afghanistan, in NEW CONSTITUTION, supra
note 77, at 125; Pasquale Pasquino, Options for a ConstitutionalCourt in Afghanistan,
in NEW CONSTITUTION, supra note 77, at 141; JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 72, at 114.
89.
A proposal from the CJ floor to establish a Constitutional High Court or
High Constitutional Council to exercise the review powers enshrined in Article 121 did
not attain a sufficient number of signatures to be further considered by the
Reconciliation Committee.
90.
See AFG. CONST. art. 157.
91.
Cf. Jose Cheibub,
Systems of Government: Parliamentarism &
Presidentialism,in NEW CONSTITUTION, supra note 77, at 114; JOHNSON ET AL., supra
note 72, at 101.
92.
Cf. Rubin, supra note 28, at 12.

20061

CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND INTERNA TIONAL LA W

witnessed a revival of claims to strengthen the Parliament to the
detriment of presidential powers. A strong parliamentary system was
favored by non-Pushtun, who sought to control the presumably
Pushtun President (Karzai), and even advocated for the CLJ to
assume the role of Parliament in the interim until elections were
conducted. 93 In the end, fears of a fragmented and dysfunctional
National Assembly combined with a historic resentment against the
role of political parties and international support for a strong
President, resulted in full presidentialism with a system of checks
and balances to be exercised by the National Assembly. Accordingly,
the President, to be elected by popular vote, 94 serves as head of state
and chairs the government. 95 The President enjoys considerable
powers ranging from determining the fundamental policies of the
state to the appointment of key officials. 96 In exercising the
constitutional functions, however, the President is in many regards
tied to the approval of the National Assembly, which may launch
impeachment proceedings when the President is accused of having
committed a "crime against humanity." 97 While, similar to the
Iranian model, the President himself is not authorized to dissolve the
National Assembly.
3. Centralism
Closely linked to the arguments behind the debate over
presidentialism or parliamentarism, the issue of decentralization in
Afghanistan has remained contentious throughout the constitutionmaking process. The overarching theme concerned the extent to
which an ethnically diverse Afghanistan could achieve political
stability and development by either retaining and reinforcing central
governance or leaning towards a federal structure, which would
delegate significant executive and legislative powers to sub-units of
that state.98 Traditionally, Afghanistan has followed the principle of
centralism with an administration that is "meant to enable the center
to control the periphery, not to help local communities to exercise
self-government."9 9 Despite initiatives within the CLJ to adopt

93.
Two proposals were made from the floor in this regard: (1) the formation of
a Parliament from the members of the CI- and (2) the establishment of an Interim
National Assembly, consisting of the CLA delegates, to assume all legislative authority
until parliamentary elections.
94.

AFG. CONST. art. 61 (2004).

95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. arts. 60-61.
Id. art. 64.
Id. art. 69.
Yash Ghai, Unitary or Federal: A False Choice? Decentralizationof State

Powers in Afghanistan, in NEW CONSTITUTION, supra note 77, at 145.

99.

Rubin, supra note 28, at 15; cf. Malikyar & Rubin, supra note 39, at 37.
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measures to prevent Pushtun imposition through the center, the fear
of disintegration in view of the ethnic diversity characterizing
Afghanistan coupled with the assumption that a strong centralized
government would be required to ensure political stability after the
years of internal conflict resulted in the affirmation of the principle of
centralism. However, some measure of local governance is provided
for in the Constitution, particularly Article 137, which provides that
the government, in preserving the principles of centralism, shall
transfer necessary powers to local administrations to accelerate and
improve economic, social, and cultural matters and foster people's
participation in developing national life. 100
Moreover, the
Constitution envisages the establishment, through popular vote, of
provincial councils in every province and local councils in districts.101
Apart from the role in the establishment of the Upper House of the
Parliament, the provincial council is to participate in the attainment
of the development objectives of the state and improvement of affairs
of the province and shall advise the provincial administrations on
related issues. 10 2 The district councils are meant to organize activities
and attain active participation of the people in provincial
administrations in districts and in villages. 10 3 The specific mandates
and powers vis-A-vis the administration of the province and district
council are deferred to further implementing legislation currently
being developed.
4. Ethnic Diversity and Minority Rights
Not surprisingly, the constitutional debate was significantly
shaped by diverging approaches on how Afghanistan's ethnic
diversity should be adequately reflected in the Constitution. To
complicate a matter already difficult to resolve, the debate on issues
such as official languages, recognition of minorities and their
language, national anthem, etc., was closely linked to the formation of
opposing groups within the CLJ on broader political issues, such as
the debate between presidentialism and parliamentarism outlined
earlier. In other words, parallel debates on various contentious issues
were increasingly associated with ethnic considerations and
concessions sought or made on one end entailed implications on the
other. Among all the areas of disagreement, whether driven by ethnic
or other considerations, the language of Afghanistan aroused the
most controversy. The extent to which various languages spoken in
Afghanistan should be recognized by the Constitution, if not become

100.
101.
102.
103.

AFG. CONST. art. 137 (2004).
Id. arts. 138, 141.
Id. art. 139.
Id. art. 140.
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official languages of the state, swiftly evolved into a venting device for
ethnic politics lurking underneath most of the debate. Among all the
languages spoken in Afghanistan, Pushtu (the language of the
previously ruling group) spoken by 35% and Dari (a form of Persian)
spoken by at least 50% are the most common.10 4 With a reasserted
sense of political significance, the Pushtuns were keen on
strengthening their ethnic heritage and thus strongly advocating for
Pushtu being one of the, if not the only, official languages.
Conversely, the northern groups-the Tajiks and Uzbeks-demanded
the recognition and promotion of Turkic languages being spoken by
11%.105 Add the relationship between Dari and Pushtu, the issue of
citizenship, and the language of the national anthem to the equation
and the dilemma seemed irresolvable. 10 6 The CLJ delegates, however,
against massive mobilization of Pushtun delegates close to Hamid
Karzai threatening to render the assembly dysfunctional, managed to
reach a compromise on the basis of the 1964 Constitution and the
2003 Draft Constitution. 10 7 In both, Dari and Pushtu were proclaimed
as the official and "national" language of the state.' 08 Article 16 of the
2004 Constitution reconciles the diverging views by declaring Pushtu
and Dari as official languages of the state, while recognizing Uzbeki,
Turkmani, Baluchi, Pachaie, Nuristani, Pamiri, and others as current
languages of the country. It adds that,
[i]n areas where the majority of the people speak in any of Uzbeki,
Turkmani, Pachaie, Nuristani, Baluchi or Pamiri languages, any of the
aforementioned language, in addition to Pashto and Dari, shall be the
109
third language, the usage of which shall be regulated by law.

Moreover, the Constitution provides that effective programs are to be
designed and applied to foster and develop all languages of
Afghanistan and that the usage of all languages in the country is to

104.
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The World Factbook, Afghanistan,
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/af.html.
105.
Id.
106.
Rubin, supra note 28, at 17.
107.
Id. (noting that, in fact, the matter could initially not be resolved through
the Working Committees and the Reconciliation Committee. Several proposals for
amendments were made from the floor of the CMJ, ranging from the recognition of all
languages to the promotion of Pushtu to the "national language" to preserve the
national identity. While the latter was supported by 193 of the 502 delegates, the
compromise reached was based on a proposal supported by a slight majority (265
signatures)).
108.
AFG. CONST. art. 3 (1964); Draft Const. art. 16. It should be noted that
Article 23 of the 1977 Constitution, Article 8 of the 1987 and the 1990 Constitution,
and Article 8 of the 1992 Draft Constitution (1992-1996) recognized Dari and Pushtu
as official languages of the state. See THE CONSTITUTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note
80.
109.
AFG. CONST. art. 16, § 2 (2004).
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be free in press publications as well as mass media. 110 Consistent
with the recognition of ethnic diversity in Afghanistan, the
Constitution calls upon the state to "design and implement effective
programs and prepare the ground for teaching mother tongues in
areas where they are spoken.""' The extent to which the government
will have the capacity and resources to devise and implement these
programs is, of course, questionable in view of the currently pressing
demands for the reconstruction of infrastructure and for the reestablishment of functioning institutions. In return for the
concessions made with regard to the recognition of languages spoken
in Afghanistan, agreement was reached to keep the national anthem
in Pushtu despite a proposal from the CLJ floor to introduce it in both
Dari and Pushtu. 1 12 The anthem, however, must mention the names
113
of the tribes in Afghanistan.
5. Fundamental Rights of Citizens and Non-Discrimination
In view of Afghanistan's recent history of human rights
violations and gender discrimination, the international community
paid particular attention to ensuring that human rights were
adequately
safeguarded.
Complementing
the
international
community's efforts, the United Nations and national and
international NGOs, launched numerous initiatives to raise
awareness and lobby key actors-such as the CLJ delegatesconcerning human rights issues that should be reflected in the
Constitution; these groups also proposed draft language, some of
which was incorporated in the final version. 114 It should be noted,
however, that the CLJ experienced serious cases of intimidation and
human rights violations, particularly with regard to the ability of
115
women to freely express their political views in the CLJ tent.

110.
Id. art. 16, §§ 3-4.
111.
Id. art. 43, § 3.
112.
It should be noted, however, that that issue has remained contentious. See
Rubin, supra note 28.
113.
AFG. CONST. art. 20 (2004).
114.
For example, some of the changes proposed by the Gender and Law
Working Group, such as the one relating to female representatives at the Lower House
of the National Assembly (Article 83), were incorporated. See AFG. CONST. art. 83, § 6
(2004); see also Gender and Law Working Group, Recommendations for the
Constitution, reprinted in LAURYN OATES & ISABELLE SOLON HELAL, AT THE CROSSROADS OF CONFLICT AND DEMOCRACY: WOMEN AND AFGHANISTAN'S CONSTITUTIONAL
LOYA JIRGA annex C (2004). Moreover, the community of persons with disabilities,
supported by the United Nations through (legal advisors of) the Comprehensive
Afghanistan Disabled Programme, effectively lobbied for and achieved changes to the
Draft Constitution with regard to disability. AFG. CONST. arts. 53, 84 § 4 (2004).
115.
Even though a complaints mechanism had been instituted under the aegis
of the United Nations, serious incidents occurred, such as the moving speech by
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Article 7 of the Constitution which, among other things, calls upon
the state to "observe the U.N. Charter [and] the Declaration of
Human Rights" may be seen as the result of strong international
pressure on the transitional government and key participants at the
Loya Jirga.n 6 Starting with freedom of religion-even though subject
to further legislation' 1 7-the Constitution follows the tradition of
previous constitutions, 1 8 by providing for a catalogue of fundamental
rights as well as numerous human rights-related guarantees. 119
These range from civil and political rights to economic, cultural, and
social rights. 120 Most notably, Article 22 explicitly prohibits any kind
of discrimination and provides that "[t]he citizens of Afghanistanwhether man or woman-have equal rights and duties before the
law."'12 1 Moreover, the Constitution guarantees specific economic and
social rights of every citizen, such as to education, 122 preventive
health care and medical treatment. 123 With regard to education, the
Constitution calls upon the state to provide free education at all
levels (including university education up to the bachelor's level). 12 4 In
a careful attempt to address the problem of Afghan traditionalism the
Constitution instructs the state to adopt "necessary measures to
ensure the physical and psychological well being of the family,
especially of [the] child and mother, upbringing of children, and the
elimination of traditions contrary to the principles of [the] sacred
1 25
religion of Islam."'
While the implementation of a majority of these rights enshrined
in the Constitution are subject to further legislation and presumably

Malalai Joya which triggered death threats and silenced women's participation in the
CIA proceedings. See OATES & SOLON HELAL, supra note 114, at 29.
116.
See discussion infra Part V.2.
AFG. CONST. art. 2 (2004).
117.
118.

AFG. CONST. arts. 9-26 (1931); AFG. CONST. arts. 25-40 (1964); AFG. CONST.

arts. 27-47 (1977); AFG. CONST. arts. 27-34 (1980); AFG. CONST. arts. 33-64 (1987);
AFG. CONST. arts. 33-64 (1990); Draft Const. arts. 47-64 (1992).
119.
See AFG. CONST. arts. 22-59 (2004).
120.
For example, right to life (Article 23), right to liberty and human dignity
(Article 24), presumption of innocence (Article 25), judicial guarantees (Articles 26-28,
31, 135), prohibition of torture and punishment contrary to the human dignity (Article
29), right to political participation (Article 33), freedom of expression (Article 34),
freedom of association (Article 35), freedom of assembly (Article 36), freedom and
confidentiality of correspondence (Article 37), inviolability of premises (Article 38),
freedom of movement (Article 39), inviolability of property (Article 40), right to
education (Article 43), right to work (Article 48), prohibition of forced labor (Article 49),
and right to healthcare (article 52). AFG. CONST. (2004).
121.
Id. art. 22 (emphasis added).
122.
Id. art. 43.
123.
Id. art. 52.
124.
Id. art. 43, §§ 1-2.
125.
Id. art. 54 (emphasis added); see OATES & SOLON HELAL, supra note 114, at
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not directly enforceable, the Constitution mandates the creation of an
Independent Human Rights Commission to monitor, respect, and
foster human rights in Afghanistan. 126 The Commission has the
authority to receive human rights complaints from individuals and to
refer them to the judiciary. 127 In practice, the Human Rights
Commission established in the Bonn Agreement has already played
an important role in reporting human rights violations, lobbying for
human rights (including with regard to the constitution-making
process), and addressing the issue of transitional justice and national
reconciliation.

V. THE 2004 CONSTITUTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAw-A "LOVE AND
HATE" RELATIONSHIP

While considerable international attention focused on ensuring
that the new Constitution would be democratic and would reconcile
the political and religious preconditions of a conservative Islamic
nation, less attention was paid to legal technicalities. In fact, because
of compromises made by the CMJ, the language contained in the 2004
Constitution contains numerous loopholes and areas open to
conflicting interpretation. The Draft Constitution, largely based on
the 1964 Constitution, similarly suffered from insufficient legal
considerations because important political issues overshadowed a
focus on details.
In the Constitution-drafting process culminating in the adoption
of the 2004 Constitution, the focus was on meeting the deadlines
stipulated in the Bonn Agreement rather than on developing a legally
sound and consistent document. The composition of the
Constitutional Drafting and Review Commissions was not driven by
legal considerations, but by the need for establishing a balanced
platform for a basic structural conception of the future of
Afghanistan. Perhaps a function of the "light footed" approach and its
emphasis on national ownership, neither the Drafting Commission
nor the Review Commission perceived the technical assistance offered
by the international community as anything but advisory. 128 Indeed,
the technical assistance focused on providing large conceptual choices
based on comparative studies and was not geared towards providing
legal technicalities of constitutional drafting. The little constitutional
expertise available within the United Nations concentrated on
commissioning comparative studies. 129 The few attempts to highlight

126.

AFG. CONST. art. 58 (2004).

127.
128.
129.

Id.
Rubin, supra note 28.
Id.
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technical concerns were either not taken seriously or were
functionally deficient.
Tellingly, even though the Presidential Decree concerning the
convening of the CLJ envisaged that candidates to be elected as CLJ
delegates should possess adequate literacy and authority and
"relative knowledge of constitutional principles,"130 most of the
influential delegates to the CLJ, including some of the Chairpersons
of the ten Working Committees, were not known for their knowledge
of constitutional principles. The difficulties one encounters in postconflict state-building-in particular the lack of sufficient technical
capacity combined with the need to swiftly implement reform
processes to overcome the volatile security conditions generated by
post-conflict power vacuums-contributed to a neglect of technical
concerns of a pure legal nature. There is an inherent danger that
these technical inconsistencies may ultimately give rise to severe
impediments to the implementation of the Constitution. Moreover,
they may unintentionally give rise to interpretations contrary to the
spirit of the Constitution as well as the object and purpose pursued by
its drafters. In view of the broad review authority of the Supreme
Court, the technical loopholes in the Constitution may yield vast
discretionary power to the members of the Court inclined to reverse
certain progressive accomplishments reflected in the Constitution.
One of the technical shortcomings of the 2004 Constitution
concerns the relationship between international law and the Afghan
domestic legal system. On its face, it is a rather doctrinal and
arguably old-fashioned issue, but the lack of constitutional clarity
may reflect negatively on Afghanistan's commitment to international
obligations, whether based on treaties or customary law. In
particular, it may give rise to jurisprudence by the Supreme Court
and the lower courts that contravenes Afghanistan's human rights
obligations. As will be addressed in more detail, the matter is
aggravated by the dual function of the Supreme Court as a court of
cassation and constitutional review.
Before taking a closer look at the relationship between
international law and the municipal legal system, in particular the
extent to which international law forms part of the Afghan legal
system, it seems appropriate to briefly outline international doctrine
and practice.

130.
President of the Islamic Transitional State of Afghanistan on the
Convening of the Constitutional Loya Jirga art. 3(c) (July 15, 2003)(emphasis added),
available at http://unama-afg.org/docs/Docs.htm, follow "Presidential Decree about
convening the Constitutional Loya Jirga."
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A. Brief Look at the Theory: InternationalLaw and Municipal Law
The doctrinal discourse between international and municipal law
is almost as old as public international law itself. Yet, in the absence
of consistent and uniform state practice, doctrine remains at odds
with formulating a unified and intrinsically consistent theory as to
the legal value of international law within a municipal legal system.
Instead, there are two competing jurisprudential theories explaining
the practice of states. In public international law parlance, the
competing approaches are captured in the distinction between the
"monist" and "dualist" schools. 13 1 The monist theory is based on a
unitary perception of the law and views both international and
municipal law as forming parts of the same legal order with either
municipal or international law being supreme over the other. 132 The
dualist theory, on the other hand, assumes that international law and
municipal law are two separate legal systems, which exist
independently of each other. 133
Depending on the theoretical
approach, international law may be incorporated into the municipal
legal system either through the mechanism of "transformation"
(dualism) or "adoption" (monism). 134 In the latter case, retaining

131.
1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 35 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed.
1955); 1 OSTERREICHISCHES HANDBUCH DES VOLKERRECHTS 144, (H. Neuhold et. al.

eds., 4th ed. 2004), [hereinafter HANDBUCH]; Veijo Heiskanen, The Relation of
International and Municipal Law, 1 FIN. Y.B. INT'L L. 154 (1990); Rett R.
Ludwikowski, Supreme Law or Basic Law? The Decline of the Concept of Constitutional
Supremacy, 9 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 253, 254 (2001); Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern,
Transformation or Adoption of International Law into Municipal Law, 12 INT'L &
COMP. L.Q. 88 (1963); J.G. Starke, Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International
Law, 17 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 66 (1936); Quincy Wright, InternationalLaw in Its Relation
to ConstitutionalLaw, 17 AM. J. INT'L L. 236 (1923).
132.
HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 553 (Robert W. Tucker
ed., 2d ed. 1966); Hans Kelsen, Die Einheit von V6lkerrecht und staatlichem Recht, 19
ZA6 R.V. 234 (1958).
133.
1 D. ANZILOTTI, COURT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, 51 (1929); 1 HEINRICH
TRIEPEL, VOLKERRECHT UND LANDESRECHT 111 (1899).
134.
IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 41 (6th ed.

2003); see also Andrew D. Mitchell, Genocide, Human Rights Implementation and the
Relationship Between Internationaland Domestic Law: Nulyarimma v. Thompson, 24
MELB. U. L. REV. 15, 25 (2000). Some doctrinal difference appears to exist with regard
to the terminology used in relation to the mechanisms envisaged under the respective
(monist or dualist) approaches. The term "incorporation" is sometimes used to reflect
the monist approach (i.e., that international law is considered part of domestic law),
while "transformation" is referred to in relation to the dualist school (i.e., that
international law, as separate legal system, needs to be transformed into the internal
law). Such terminological distinction is primarily found in common law literature,
such as BROWNLIE, supra; Mitchell, supra. The terminology used in this Article,
however, reflects the tradition of the Vienna School of International Law, which refers
to "incorporation" as the general term to encompass the various mechanisms by which
international law may become part of the domestic legal system. Accordingly,
international law may be incorporated either through "transformation" (dualist
approach) or adoption (monist approach). See HANDBUCH, supra note 131, at 114.
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international character is the norm, while in the former, purely
domestic is the norm. 135 More recently, scholars have sought to
abandon the dichotomy of monism and dualism in light of their
apparent inability to dogmatically explain the way international and
national courts behave. 136
The focus has shifted away from
establishing any doctrinal truisms of abstract legal theory based on
simplifications to assessing the actual practice through the lens of
13 7
pragmatism.
While the distinction between monism and dualism has only
academic value, has become outdated in light of the growing
pragmatic rhetoric, and is criticized as being a convenient reminder of
the frivolity of abstract jurisprudential speculation, 138 it highlights
the need for a conscious determination within the municipal legal
order of each state, of the extent to which international law becomes
part of municipal law. Such a determination is not necessarily made
in the Constitution of a state; it may be developed through legislation
or judicial practice. Leaving the resolution of the relationship
between international and municipal law to the judiciary, however,
attaches significant importance to the jurisprudence of the highest
courts, which may not be inclined to adequately address both the
domestic and international dimensions of the matter. 139 As a general
rule, states are at liberty to define the extent to which international
law is incorporated into their internal legal order. 140 States are
obliged to perform their international legal obligations in good faith,
however, and as is firmly established, may not invoke the provisions
of internal law as a justification for failure to perform international
obligations. 14 1 Moreover, there is a general duty to bring internal law
into conformity with international obligations, both treaty and

135.
HANDBUCH, supra note 131, at 114.
136.
BROWNLIE, supra note 134, at 33; see 1 CHARLES ROUSSEAU, DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 37 (1970); Jonkheer H. F. van Panhuys, Relations and
Interactions between International and National Scenes of Law, 112 RECEUIL DES
COURS 7 (1964-I1).

137.
For a paradoxically theoretic discussion of the pragmatic approach and
critique thereof, see Heiskanen, supra note 131, at 165.
138.

Id. at 175.

139.

Cf. Vladin S. Vereshchetin, New Constitutions and the Old Problem of the

Relationship between International Law and National Law, 7 EUR. J. INT'L L. 29 (1996)

(finding that some states incorporate international law into domestic legal systems).
140.

van Panhuys, supra note 136, at 78.

141.
Vienna Convention, supra note 45, art. 27; Articles on the Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Int'l Law Comm'n art. 3, annexed to G.A. Res.
56/83, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter
Articles on State Responsibility]. For an overview of international jurisprudence on the
principle,

see

Commentaries on the Articles on the Responsibility of States for

Internationally Wrongful Acts, Int'l L. Comm'n, 53rd Sess., U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter ILC Commentary]. Cf. BROWNLIE,
supra note 134, at 35.
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customary law. 142 Failure to implement international obligations will

entail specific consequences as provided for by the law of state
143
responsibility.
Given the doctrinal discrepancies resulting from the difficulties
in explaining state practice on the assumptions envisaged by the
dualist or monist approaches, the generalities offered above can
merely serve as an introduction to the issues that may arise in the
relationship between international and municipal law. For purposes
of the topic at hand, these doctrinal considerations can safely be set
aside and left to more authoritative analysis. 144 After all, doctrinal
considerations did not inform the constitutional debate in
Afghanistan. Instead, this Author's interest is in the specific
regulatory mechanisms that were available to the drafters of
Afghanistan's Constitution in 2003, taking into consideration the
various mechanisms applied in practice around the globe.
In practice, states are inclined to follow a "dualist" model that
works on the assumption that a constitutional or statutory
mechanism is required for incorporation of international law into the
municipal legal system. 145 In other words, the applicable norms
deriving from the international legal framework do not automatically
become part of the internal law, unless incorporated by either a
clause in the state's Constitution by implementing legislation. A
superficial look at more than forty constitutions containing clauses
pertaining to the relationship between international law and
municipal law 146 reveals that more than one-third of these
constitutions prioritize, in principle, international treaty obligations
over internal laws, whether or not those constitutions specified that
international norms were directly applicable.1 4 7 The majority of

142.
Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, Advisory Opinion, 1925
P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 10, at 20 (Feb. 21); Greco-Bulgarian "Communities", Advisory
Opinion, 1930 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 17, at 17 (July 31); BROWNLIE, supra note 134, at 35;
Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law, 92 RECUEIL DES
COURs 1, 89 (1957-II).
143.
Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 141, art. 1; ILC Commentary,
supra note 141, at 63.
144.
See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Self-Executing Treaties and the Impact of
InternationalLaw on National Legal Systems: A Research Guide, 26 INT'L J. L. INFO. 56
(1998) (providing a comprehensive review of available literature).
145.
See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
146.
A collection of national Constitutions is available on various internet sites. See
International Constitutional Law, httpl/www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl; WashLaw, Constitutional
Law-International,
http://www.washlaw.edulforint/alpha/clconstitutionallaw.htm;
Chan
Robles Virtual Law Library, Constitutional Laws of Nations, http://www.chanrobles.com/
worldconstitutions.htm; National Constitutions, httpJ/www.constitution.org/cons/natlcons.
htm; University of Richmond, Constitution Finder, httpJ/confnder.richmond.edu.
147.
See CONST. OF THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REP. OF ALG. art. 132; CONST.
ARG. § 31; CONST. OF THE REP. OF ARM. art. 6; BELR. CONST. art. 8; CONGO CONST.art.
176; CONST. OF THE REP. OF CYPRUS art. 169; CONST. OF EST. art. 123; 1975 Syntagma
[SYN] [Constitution] art. 28 (Greece); HAW. CONST. § 3; CONST. OF THE FED. DEM. REP.
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constitutions contain a general incorporation clause under which
international law-either general principles and customary law,
treaty law, or both-forms an integral part of the municipal legal
system. 148 Only a few constitutions contain general statements
proclaiming the state's adherence to international law without
further specifications as to the relationship between international
14 9
and municipal law.
As demonstrated above, constitutions of many modern countries
include clauses that provide for the adoption of international treaties
into the internal legal order. Becoming part of the internal legal
order, however, should not be confused with the treaty's applicability.
In other words, although constitutions may provide for the
incorporation of international law into domestic law, it does not
necessarily follow that treaties are applicable internally. Most
common law countries-even those incorporating international law
through a corresponding constitutional provision' 5 0-deny any direct
internal effect without implementing legislation. 151 Thus, while
treaties become effective upon ratification in terms of the state's
obligation to perform by its terms, they will have no effect in
municipal law until a legislative act is passed. 152 Moreover, while a

OF ETH. art. 9; 1958 CONST. art. 55 (Fr.); CONST. OF MAURITANIA art. 80; Konstitutsiia
Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF] [Constitution] art. 15 (Russ.); CONST. OF TUNIS. art.
32; U.S. CONST. art. VI; see also Vereshchetin, supra note 139 (providing further
examples using the constitutions of Armenia, Bulgaria, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan).
148.
Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG][Constitution] as amended 1920, arts. 9,
16, 50, 65, 66 (Austria); CONST. OF THE AZERBAIJAN REP. art. 148; 1973 CONST. OF THE
STATE OF BAHRAIN art. 37; CONST. OF BoSN. & HERZ.
3; CONST. OF BULG. art. 5;
CONST. OF CROAT. art. 5; Ustava CR (Const. of the Czech Rep.) art. 10, 52; CONST. OF
EST. art. 3; GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 25 (F.R.G.); 1975 Syntagma [SYN] [Constitution]
art. 28 (Greece); CONST. OF KUWAIT art. 70; CONST. OF LITH. arts. 7, 138; CONST. OF

MACED.

art. 118; CONST. OF MONG.

art. 10; CONST. OF NAMIB. art. 144; GW

[Constitution]

art. 93 (Neth.); THE BASIc LAW OF THE SULTANATE OF OMAN
[Constitution] art. 80; CONST. OF PARA. art. 141; CONST. OF POL. arts. 8, 87, 91; CONST.

OF PORT. art. 8; CONST. OF ROM. art. 11; Konstitutsiia Rossiiskoi Federatsii [Konst. RF]
[Constitution] art. 15 (Russ.); CONST. OF THE REP. OF SLOVN. art. 8; S. AFR. CONST.
1996, §§ 231-233; CONST. OF S. KOREA art. 6; C.E. art. 96 (Spain); CONST. OF YUGO.
art. 16; see also Vereshchetin, supra note 139 (providing examples of the constitutions
of Kirghizstan and Hungary).
149.
CONST. OF ALB. art. 5; CONST. LAW OF THE REP. OF ANGL. art. 15; COST. art.
10 (Italy); CONST. OF MONG. art. 10.
150.
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. VI.
151.
BROWNLIE, supra note 134, at 45, 48; Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our
Dualist Constitution, and the InternationalistConception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529 (1999),
Ludwikowski, supra note 131, at 268; Mitchell, supra note 134, at 26.
152.
In countries following the civil law tradition, the legislature (or part of it)
participates in the process of ratification, so that ratification becomes a legislative act,
which may entail the incorporation of the treaty into the state's municipal legal order
depending on the incorporation mechanism previewed in the Constitution. See
Katherine L. Doherty & Timothy L.H. McCormack, "Complimentarity"as a Catalyst for
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treaty may automatically-or through legislation-be incorporated
into municipal law, the treaty's applicability may still depend on
whether the treaty is worded in a self-executing manner, that is, in
153
such a manner that allows courts to directly refer to its terms.
The rules concerning the incorporation of customary law and
general principles into the internal sphere are either laid down in the
Constitution or are gradually formulated by the national courts. This
applies generally to both common law and civil law traditions.
However, a procedure by which a legislature would separately have to
transform each principle of customary international law into
municipal law would be largely impractical because it would require a
regular review of all changes of norms and principles of international
law. Such a task is difficult to master for legislative purposes. Thus,
many states, such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy,
France, Portugal, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, the Netherlands,
Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States, 154 have adopted
the principle that customary rules and general principles are to be
considered part of the law of the land. Customary international law
and general principles are therefore enforceable unless inconsistent
155
with legislation or judicial decisions.
Public international law does not oblige states to, in their
constitutions, address the incorporation of international law into the
internal legal order. However, recent practice has displayed what one
author has called the 'internationalization' of constitutions. 156 The
tendency towards constitutional codification of the relationship
between international and domestic law is particularly visible in
constitutions drafted in the aftermath of the Cold War. 157 Those
constitutions display a "tendency towards 'de jure recognition' of the
primacy of international law," at least with regard to international
human rights law vis-A-vis the municipal legal system. 158
The
advantages attached to such a practice are eminent. First and
foremost, it clarifies the relationship between international law and

Comprehensive Domestic Penal Legislation, 5 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 147, 155

(1999).
153.
John H. Jackson, Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy
Analysis, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 310, 320 (1992); cf. David Sloss, Non-Self-Executing
Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (2002) (finding
that U.S. constitutional rules, not the intent of the parties, determine if a treaty is not
self-executing).
154.
Bundesverfassungsgesetz [BVG] [Constitution] as amended 1920, arts. 9,
16, 50, 65, 66 (Austria); GRUNDGESETZ [GG] art. 25 (F.R.G.); 1975 Syntagma [SYN]
[Constitution] art. 28 (Greece); COST. art. 10 (Italy); 1958 CONST. art. 55 (Fr.); CONST.
OF PORT. art. 8; Gw [Constitution] art. 93 (Neth.); C.E. art. 96 (Spain); U.S. CONST. art,
VI.
155.
BROWNLIE, supra note 134, at 41, 48.
156.
Vereshchetin, supra note 139, at 31.
157.
Ludwikowski, supra note 131, at 287.
158.
Id. at 290; Vereshchetin, supranote 139.
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municipal law and thereby contributes to the consistency of a state's
legal order. Second, it provides a clear mechanism for the state's
implementation of its international obligations and prevents
uncertainty that may lead to the state's failure to abide by
international law. Finally, it provides national courts with valuable
guidance as to the applicability of international obligations and
prevents conflicting jurisprudence. These advantages have little costs
since the explicit determination of the relationship between
international and domestic law by a Constitution does not entail the
creation of any additional obligations under international law, but
merely clarifies the legal effects, if any, of international law within
the internal legal order. The state remains bound to international law
and the obligations deriving from its various sources regardless of
whether or not the Constitution contains a clause.
B. Afghanistan's Constitution and InternationalLaw
The 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan contains several
references to international law, in general, and international human
rights, in particular. These references, especially those alluding to
Afghanistan's adherence to international human rights obligations,
must be viewed in the context of Afghanistan's history of human
rights violations and the international community's efforts to
establish a democratic state that will be a recognized member of the
international community. Accordingly the preamble to the 2004
Constitution declares, among other things, that the Constitution is
being approved in observance of the "U.N. Charter as well as the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights" to "establish an order based
on the peoples' will and democracy" and to "form a civil society void of
oppression, atrocity, discrimination as well as violence, based on rule
of law, social justice, protecting integrity and human rights, and
attaining peoples' freedoms and fundamental rights. ' 159 As described
earlier, Chapter II of the Constitution contains a promising catalogue
of fundamental rights. 160 A systematic reading of all 162 Articles is
necessary, however, to determine the extent to which international
human rights standards and international law are actually
incorporated into the domestic legal system of Afghanistan.
The constitutional provision forming the core of the subsequent
analysis is Article 7, read in conjunction with Articles 3 and 121. On
its face, Article 7 purports to address the relationship between
international human rights law and the domestic legal system, by
providing that, "[t]he state shall observe the U.N. Charter, inter-state

159.
160.

AFG. CONST. pmbl.
Id. arts. 22-59.

5, 7, 8 (2004).
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agreements, as well as international treaties to which Afghanistan
'161
has joined, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
It is noteworthy that this provision was in the 2003 Draft
Constitution and remained unchanged during the CLJ.162 Leaving
aside inconsistencies in terminology-which are partly based on the
difficulties of adequately translating the original text in Dari and
Pushtu 163-the content of Article 7, paragraph 1, does little, if
anything, to clarify the relationship between international and
domestic Afghan law. Similar to the declarations of intent contained
in the constitutions of Albania, Angola, Italy, and Mongolia, 164 the
provision merely reaffirms Afghanistan's commitment to previouslyentered international treaties with particular reference to the U.N.
Charter. 165 The obligations arising from international treaties,
however, are binding upon Afghanistan regardless of the commitment
expressed in Article 7; those treaties are binding by virtue of
signature and ratification not constitutional incorporation. Simply
put, Article 7 does nothing other than pay lip service to Afghanistan's
pre-existing obligation to uphold the terms of international treaties.
The superficiality of the Article becomes evident when read in
light of Articles 3 and 121. Article 121 endows the Supreme Court
with the mandate to act as the guardian of the Constitution and
provides that,
The Supreme Court upon the request of the Government or the Courts
can review compliance with the Constitution of laws, legislative
decrees, international treaties and international covenants, and
166
interpret them in accordance with the law.

161.
Id. art. 7, § 1.
162.
See Rubin, supra note 28, at 14-15. While paragraph 1 of Article 7
remained unaltered, a reference to the state's obligation to prevent the "production and
consumption of intoxicants" was added by the CIM Reconciliation Committee. A
separate proposal calling for a definition of "terrorism" did not succeed absent
sufficient support (number of valid signatures from CJ delegates).
163.
AFG. CONST. (2004). One may note the redundancy in referring to
"international treaties to which Afghanistan has joined," in addition to "inter-state
agreements."
164.

CONST. OF ALB. art. 5; CONST. LAW OF THE REP. OF ANGL. art. 15; COST. art.

10 (Italy); CONST. OF MONG. art. 10.
165.
Article 7 somewhat resembles Article 16 of the 1980 Constitution of
Afghanistan, which reads: 'The Democratic Republic of Afghanistan will respect and
observe the U.N. charter and the generally accepted principles of international law and
supports the United Nation's activities in strengthening peace and developing
international cooperation." AFG. CONST. art. 16 (1980), reprinted in THE
CONSTITUTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 80. The same applies to the 1987
Constitution, which further expanded the reference to international obligations
contained in the 1980 text. Article 133 provided that, "the Republic of Afghanistan
respects and observes the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and other accepted principles and norms of international law." AFG. CONST. arts. 33-64
(1987), reprinted in THE CONSTITUTIONS OF AFGHANISTAN, supra note 80.
166.

AFG.CONST. art. 121 (2004) (emphasis added).
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Leaving aside inconsistencies in terminology, Article 121 discloses the
true nature of Afghanistan's approach to international law. Most
importantly, it establishes the supremacy of domestic law over
international treaty obligations by elevating the Constitution above
international law and adopting a radical monist approach with regard
to the primacy of domestic law. 167 The Supreme Court is obligated to
declare international treaties unconstitutional if they contradict the
terms of the Constitution.
While decisions of the Supreme Court as to the constitutionality
of treaty obligations will not per se result in the nullification of
Afghanistan's corresponding obligations under international law, the
authority of the Supreme Court to uphold the supremacy of domestic
vis-A-vis international provisions may considerably limit the
government's maneuverability to assume and comply with its
international obligations. The Supreme Court's authority to question
the compatibility of international obligations with provisions of
municipal law renders Afghanistan's conduct within the international
legal framework dependent on the orientation of the Supreme Court.
In this regard, the Supreme Court is merely restricted by the
requirement of judicial or governmental referral as provided for in
Article 121.168 Considering, however, the conduct of the Supreme
Court in the past, it is likely that the Supreme Court-at least in its
current composition-may deem itself competent to assume its
constitutional review functions motu proprio. While the wording of
Article 121 in conjunction with Article 7 could lend itself to an
interpretation in favor of the incorporation of international law into
the domestic legal system to the extent international law does not
contravene the constitutional law of Afghanistan, the latter
qualification merits closer scrutiny. In particular, the Constitution
must be assessed to determine if it provides any benchmarks against
which international treaty instruments are to be measured. It is also
necessary to determine which principles, in case of conflict between
the Constitution and international law, might override the rights and
obligations deriving from international law. Given the importance of
Islam in Afghanistan and its varying interpretations in tribal laws
throughout the country, one crucial benchmark could be the
Constitution's position on the role of Islam. While it is necessary to
distinguish the provisions of Islam from quasi-judicial practices based
on tribal laws claiming to be Islamic, the extent to which the

167.
In this regard, the monistic approach taken by the 2004 Constitution of
Afghanistan corresponds to the assertion that "the nature of Islamic law of nations is
,monistic' and not 'dualistic', thereby giving greater judicial validity to the acceptance
of this law as indeed 'law."' Farooq A. Hassan, The Sources of Islamic Law, 76 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 65, 71 (1982).
168.
AFG. CONST. art. 121 (2004).
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Constitution takes recourse to extra-statutory sources may entail
significant consequences on the potential of extra-constitutional
sources to serve as measurement for the "constitutionality" of
international obligations as envisioned in Article 121. In view of the
possible contradictions between allegedly Islamic tribal practices and
international human rights standards, it is crucial to determine
whether the letter of the Constitution offers a margin of
interpretation that would allow an application of shari'athat does not
conform with Afghanistan's obligations under international law.
Islam forms an essential part of Afghanistan's legal tradition
and the extent to which it would be linked to the constitutional
framework was at the core of the constitutional debate. 169 The
compromise reached in Article 3 to reconcile demands for a strong
link and a progressive statutory approach reads states that "[i]n
Afghanistan, no law can be contrary to the beliefs and provisions of
the sacred religion of Islam.' 170 Therefore, read in conjunction with
Article 121,171 the Supreme Court has the authority to strike down
legislation and declare international obligations unconstitutional if
they are contrary to the tenets and provisions of Islam. The wording,
particularly the reference to "tenets and provisions of Islam" instead
of shari'a,172 is strikingly broad and the provision accordingly lends
itself to multiple interpretations that extend beyond the realm of
statutory law and require recourse to religious sources. 173 Ultimately,
whenever norms of international law are interpreted to contradict
Islamic principles, the Supreme Court may consider them
unconstitutional. Such an approach reflects the understanding of
Muslim scholars that there is no other source of law, whether
domestic or international, other than the divine will of God. 174 The
relationship and compatibility of shari'a with the international

169.
See supra Part IV.B. 1.
170.
AFG. CONST. art. 3 (2004).
171.
AFG. CONST. art. 121 (2004) (emphasis added).
172.
As a matter of introduction, shari'aderives from the Koran as the supreme
source and guiding principles provider for the formation of legal rules, the prophetic
tradition and reports (the Sunnah and Hadith), Islamic jurisprudence (Fiqh),
consensus among those who are learned in the law (Ijma), and analogical reasoning
(Al-Qeyas). Moreover, various schools of law (Madahib) played an important role in
developing the law on the basis of the four sources mentioned previously. See SAMI
ZUBAIDA, LAW AND POWER IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD 11 (2003); Hassan, supra note 167;

Majid Khadduri, Islam and the Modern Law of Nations, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 358, 359
(1956); David A. Westbrook, Islamic InternationalLaw and Public InternationalLaw:
Separate Expressions of World Order, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 819, 823 (1993).
173.
The omission of any explicit reference to shari'a may either be interpreted
as limiting its scope to the main principles of Islam or including Islamic law as
provisions of the holy religion of Islam. See Khadduri, supra note 172.
174.
Husayn Salimi, Introduction to Irano-Islamic Views on Human Rights, in
ISLAMIC VIEWS ON HUMAN RIGHTS: VIEWPOINTS OF IRANIAN SCHOLARS, at I (Husayn

Salimi ed., 1st Indian ed. 2003); Khadduri, supra note 172.
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human rights framework has been the subject of continuous academic
debate.' 75 While the argument is often made in the West that specific
aspects of shari'a are inconsistent with international human rights
standards, Islamic legal scholars would argue that, "human rights lie
at the heart of Islam,"'1 76 and that the human rights standards
established in various instruments correspond to the teachings of
Islam. 177 The latter proposition appears to be reflected in the 2004
Constitution, which has a catalogue of fundamental rights in Chapter
1
1I. 78 Moreover, the Constitution seeks to eradicate tribal practices
that are based on an aberrant interpretation of Islam by calling upon
the state to eliminate "traditions contrary to the principles of [the]
1 79
sacred religion of Islam."'
By disqualifying those practices as un-Islamic, the Constitution
promotes an application of Islam that is not contrary to its human
rights guarantees. Any interpretation that holds that fundamental
human rights are contrary to the principles and tenets of Islam would
result in an irreconcilable contradiction within the Constitution
between Article 3 and the provisions contained in Chapter II.
Additionally, the wording of Article 3 refers to the prohibition of laws
contrary to the tenets and provisions of Islam, which seems to confine
the potential cases in which issues of compatibility with Islamic
principles were to arise to simple legislation. Moreover, the
Constitution's reference in Article 7 to international human rights
instruments-for example, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights-would be contrary to Article 3 if the provisions contained in
those international human rights instruments were in conflict with

175.
Cf. ISAM KAMEL SALEM, ISLAM UND VOLKERRECHT: DAS VOLKERRECHT IN
DER ISLAMISCHEN WELTANSHAUUNG (1984); FARHAD MALEKIAN, THE CONCEPT OF
ISLAMIC INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (1994); C.G.
WEERAMANTRY, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1988);

Gamal M. Badr, A Survey of Islamic InternationalLaw, 76 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 56
(1982); Hassan, supra note 167; Sobhi Mahmassani, The Principles of International
Law in the Light of Islamic Doctrine, 117 RECUEIL DES COURS 205 (1966-I); Westbrook,
supra note 172.
176.
See, e.g., Sa'idah Lutfiyan, Human Rights in Practice: The Violation of the
Muslims' Rights Throughout the World and the Position of the U.N. Toward this Issue,
in ISLAMIC VIEWS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 174, at 345, 350; cf. Salimi, supra note
174; MIRIAM A. NAWABI, WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN THE NEW CONSTITUTION OF AFGHANISTAN

4
(2003),
http://www.cic.nyu.edu/archive/pdf/E22Womens%/2ORightsFullVersion
Nawabi.pdf.
177.
Cf. The Cairo Declaration on Human Rights in Islam pmbl.
4, in
COLUMBIA UNIV., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF HUM. RTS., TWENTY-FIVE HUMAN RIGHTS

DOCUMENTS 190 (1994); Kirmani, Survey of the Similaritiesand Differenced of Human
Rights in Islam and the West, in ISLAMIC VIEWS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 174, at

97.; Riffat Hassan, Are Human Rights Compatible With Islam? The Issue of the Rights
of Women in Muslim Communities, http://www.religiousconsultation.org/hassan2.htm.
178.
See discussion supra Part IV.2.
179.

AFG. CONST. art. 54 (2004).
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Islamic principles. The 2004 Constitution requires a harmonizing
interpretation of the principles and tenets of Islam on the one hand,
and international human rights standards on the other, at least in
theory.
In practice, however, it may be presumed that such a systematic
interpretation in favor of constitutionalism is not a given. Rather, it
is conceivable that in contentious cases, local courts and the Supreme
Court would adopt an interpretation that disregards any conflicting
human rights standards prescribed by international law and in favor
of Islamic principles. Ultimately, the Supreme Court may be inclined
to view international human rights instruments as laws in
contravention of the tenets and provisions of Islam and exercise its
mandate in Article 121 to declare specific provisions of international
human rights instruments unconstitutional. To illustrate the
constitutional dilemma that may arise as a consequence, one may
refer to the obligations deriving from the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW). i80 In notable contrast to many Islamic states,' 8 '
Afghanistan deposited its instrument of ratification on March 5,
2003, without reservation. Given the tribal interpretations of shari'a
commonly found throughout the informal justice sector, Afghanistan's
reservation-free ratification of the CEDAW stands as a manifestation
of the international community's pressure to promote the eradication
of judicial practices contrary to international human rights.
According to Article 16 of the CEDAW, Afghanistan is obliged to
"ensure on a basis of equality of men and women ... the same right to
enter into marriage[,] the same right to freely choose a spouse and to
enter into marriage only with their free and full consent[, and] the
same rights and responsibilities during marriage and at its
dissolution.' 8 3 Moreover, under the terms of the Convention the
"betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no legal effect, and

180.
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
181.
E.g. The Kingdom of Bahrain entered into reservations concerning, among
other things, Articles 2 and 16 "in so far as it is incompatible with the provisions of the
Islamic Shari'a"; similarly the reservations entered into by Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Lybian Arab Jamahiriya, Malaysia, Morocco, Syrian Arab Republic, and the
United Arab Emirates. See U.N. Dept. of Econ. & Soc. Affairs, Div. for the Adv. of
Women, Declarations, Reservations and Objections to CEDAW, http://www.un.org/
womenwatchldaw/cedaw/reservations-country.htm
(providing the texts of the
respective reservations and objections to CEDAW). With regard to the validity of the
treaty reservations vis-a-vis the object and purpose of the CEDAW, and in light of the
objections made, see HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS IN CONTEXT 439 (2nd ed., 2000). But see Nasrin Musaffa, InternationalRules
for Women's Rights: A Challenge of Values, in ISLAMIC VIEWS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra
note 174, at 191, 199.
183.
CEDAW, supra note 180, art. 16.1 (a)-(c).
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all necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken to specify a
minimum age for marriage .... ,"184 However, the practice of arranged
marriages prevails throughout Afghanistan, particularly in the rural
areas where tribal laws de facto derogate statutory laws, such as the
1977 Civil Law of Afghanistan. 8 5 Moreover, women continue to be
stoned to death for adultery as prescribed by shari'a,l8 6 even though
they have sought a divorce or were the victims of rape. 8 7 While
these may be extreme cases, partly based on a misapplication of the
provisions of Islam by shuras (local councils), 8 8 it demonstrates the
extent to which Afghan women continue to be deprived of their rights
through the application of ancient tribal laws and traditions.1 8 9 This
is not to argue that the formal legal system is currently in violation of
Afghanistan's obligations under the CEDAW-that is an issue that
requires considerably more attention than can be afforded within the
framework of this Article.
Rather, the argument is, that the wording of Article 3 provides
ample opportunity for courts to find international norms to be in
violation of what is locally understood as being part of the "principles
and tenets" of Islam, potentially halting Afghanistan's commitment to
international human rights standards. The same reasoning may
apply to the Supreme Court, under its Article 121 authority. It may
be conceivable that the Supreme Court construes Article 121 in
conjunction with Article 3 in such a fashion that would allow the
Supreme Court to give preference to the application of what it
considers Islamic principles over international law. 190 To follow the

Id.
184.
185.
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AFGHANISTAN: WOMEN STILL UNDER ATTACK: A
(2005),
http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/
FAILURE
TO
PROTECT
SYSTEMATIC

ASA1 10072005ENGLISH/$File/ASA1 100705.pdf.
Article 426 of the 1976 Penal Code of Afghanistan (in Chapter 8 entitled
186.
"Adultery, Pederasty, and Violations of Honour") provides for the application of shari'a
punishment when the conditions spelled out by shari'a are fulfilled. PENAL CODE ch. 8,
art. 426 (1976)(Afg.).

187.
Reports documenting the application of shari'a principles in contravention
of the rights set out in the CEDAW are frequent, particularly in the rural areas of
Afghanistan.

See, e.g., N.C. Aizenman, A Killing Commanded by Tradition: Afghan

Adultery Case Reflects Challenge of Extending Modern Law to Tribal Lands, WASH.
POST, May 7, 2005, at Al; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 185.
Malikyar & Rubin, supra note 39, at 24; see also AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL,
188.
supra note 185.

189.
See, e.g., The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights,
Report of the Special Rapporteurof the Commission on Human Rights on The Situation
of Women and Girls in Afghanistan, U.N. Doc. A/58/421 (Oct. 6, 2003); NAWABI, supra
note 176, at 9-12.

190.
Judging from the wording of the Constitution, the Supreme Court would, in
this regard, not appear to be bound by the programmatic provision calling upon the
state to adopt measures to attain the elimination of traditions contrary to the
principles of Islam. See AFG. CONST. art. 54 (2004).
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examples just illustrated, the Supreme Court may be called upon to
decide on the constitutionality of CEDAW in relation to the principles
and tenets of Islam concerning the right of women to enter or dissolve
a marriage. 19 1 On such occasions, the Supreme Court could declare
that specific provisions of the CEDAW are incompatible with shari'a
principles. This would be functionally equivalent to the reservations
made to the CEDAW by other Islamic states. 19 2 Thus, by holding that
these shari'aprovisions amount to principles and tenets of Islam, the
Supreme Court could simply override any treaty obligations arising
from Afghanistan's ratification of the CEDAW.
Additionally, the 2004 Constitution remains silent on the
relationship between sources of international law other than treaties,
193
such as customary international law and general principles of law
as well as decisions of international organizations. Moreover, the
Constitution leaves considerable uncertainties as to the processes
through which Afghanistan enters into treaty obligations and
participates in international organizations. 194 On the positive side
(though with some measure of controversy) the declaration contained
195
in Article 7 to abide by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
could assume significance under international law; it may render a
non-committal document binding on Afghanistan by virtue of a
unilateral act or estoppel. 196 Overall, however, the 2004 Constitution
of Afghanistan contains substantial loopholes prone to nourishing a
judicial practice to the detriment of Afghanistan's explicit
commitment to the international normative framework.

191.
As mentioned earlier, according to the Constitution the Supreme Court
assumes a dual function as court of ultimate resort and constitutional court. With
regard to the former, the Supreme Court may review cases on revision (on matters of
law). See AFG. CONST.arts. 116, 120 (2004).
192.
See STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 181, at 439.
193.
Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, para.1, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments.htm.
194.
The 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan merely mentions in Article 64,
paragraph 17, which enumerates the powers of the President, that the President shall
"issue credential letters for the conclusion of international treaties in accordance with
the provisions of the law." It does not specify whether the President has the authority
to sign international treaties, though it may be inferred by virtue of nemo plus iuris
transferepotest quam ipse habet. AFG. CONST. art. 64, § 17 (2004). It should, however,
be noted that the Constitution clarifies that the National Assembly is vested with the
authority to ratify international treaties or abrogate the membership of Afghanistan in
them. Id. art. 90, § 5.
195.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810
(Dec. 12, 1948).
196.
See BROWNLIE, supra note 134, at 613 (discussing "unilateral declarations"
and the principles of "estoppel").
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C. Legal Uncertaintiesand Missed Opportunities
The recently adopted Afghan Constitution does not provide
clarification or mechanisms concerning the implementation of
international obligations because it was largely perceived to be an
academic question amid the numerous fundamental political and
religious issues that overshadowed the debate. Moreover, there was
little understanding and capacity to understand the legal principles
that needed to be addressed. In summary, the main concern relates to
the lack of clarification, and the arising uncertainty, with regard to
the relationship between international law and Afghanistan's
internal legal order. The facially ambitious Article 7 of the 2004
Constitution merely re-states that Afghanistan will abide by its
international obligations, without providing for a specific
incorporation mechanism. 197 Viewed from the public international
law perspective, the legal value of the provision is minimal because
Afghanistan remains bound to its international obligations regardless
of whether the Constitution re-affirms its commitment to abide by its
international obligations. The inclusion of a reference to the
relationship between these international obligations and municipal
law would have greatly enhanced the legal value of Article 7 without
any political compromises.
While numerous states have adopted a similar approach in their
Constitutions, the case of Afghanistan stands out as a missed
opportunity in view of the heavy international exposure and
involvement. By failing to address the legal "technicalities" of
whether international law affects domestic law or requires
implementing legislation, Article 7 in conjunction with Articles 3 and
121 could easily reverse a progression that came at great political
cost. The effects would have been the same if the Constitution had
not addressed international human rights at all. Instead of
determining to what extent, if any, international law created an
obligation within the legal system of Afghanistan, the drafters of the
Constitution delegated the task to a judiciary that is currently
unlikely to fully appreciate the complexities of incorporation theories
and the consequences thereof. Rather, it is likely that the national
dimensions of Afghanistan's membership to the international
normative framework will receive little attention in judicial practice,
particularly when considering the inherent tensions between the
constitutional exhortation that no law shall contravene the tenets
and provisions of Islam and international human rights standards.

197.

AFG. CONST. art. 7 (2004).
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VI. CONCLUSION: ASSESSMENT, LESSONS LEARNED AND DILEMMAS
INHERENT IN MULTILATERAL CONSTITUTION-MAKING AND STATEBUILDING

Afghanistan's current quest for achieving stability and peace
cannot be viewed in isolation from the international normative
framework that continues to determine and drive the state-building
processes on various levels. First, the origin of reform is based on the
international community's endeavor to effectuate regime change on
the assumption that a thriving democratic Afghanistan will spur
human development and contribute to international peace and
stability. Second, the international dimensions of the military
intervention in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, influenced the
context of the basis on which Afghanistan was to be rebuilt. In
attempting to strike a balance between the detrimental effects on the
sustainability of reform attached to full-fledged international (U.N.)
administration and the political risks associated with insufficient
international involvement, the Bonn Agreement reflects a
compromise between a domestic program for the consolidation of
power and specific benchmarks to ensure that the state-building
agenda evolves in a manner acceptable to the international
community. In the latter regard, the international community acts as
a watchdog of democracy, whose financial means in the form of
bilateral and multilateral "benevolence" entail significant leverage to
inform the way by which Afghanistan is to rise to the circle of
democratic states. Third, and as a consequence of the international
engagement that ultimately led to the ousting of the Taliban regime,
the state-building processes themselves are not purely domestic, but
closely tied to the assistance provided by individual donors in
conjunction with the United Nations and other organizations. This
assistance is not imposed, at least technically, but provided on the
basis of the normative framework enshrined in the 2001 Bonn
Agreement.
These international dimensions have certainly contributed to the
successful implementation of the state-building agenda envisaged in
the Bonn Agreement starting with the establishment of the
transitional government in 2002 and culminating in the recent
establishment of the National Assembly. While the transition from a
collapsed state to a domestic and internationally legitimate
democratic state has initially been governed by the processes
stipulated in the agreement reached in Bonn under the auspices of
the United Nations, the formal foundations for the longevity of
democracy in Afghanistan are dependent on the terms and provisions
of the state's Constitution. Recognizing the importance of the
constitutional framework as a social compact on which the structures
of a state are to be laid, the Bonn Agreement envisioned a quasiparticipatory constitution-making process that was to ensure the
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legitimacy and effectiveness of Afghanistan's new constitutional
framework. Afghanistan's constitutional legitimacy would allow the
establishment of a government headed by a President elected by
popular vote as well as the establishment of a National Assembly
through general elections.
The constitution-making process in Afghanistan therefore
remained closely linked to the international community's efforts to
delimitate the borders within which political compromises were to be
reached to accommodate political and cultural preconditions for the
popular acceptance of the constitutional framework. These borders
were a reflection of the fundamental pre-requisites of any democratic
state as determined and formulated by the international normative
framework through its international human rights standards. The
international community accordingly placed significant emphasis on
the reinforced acceptance of and compliance with human rights
standards to be incorporated in Afghanistan's post-conflict
constitution. This emphasis, however, has yielded limited results in
view of the 2004 Constitution's insufficient attention to the
technicalities with regard to the relationship between the
international legal framework and the domestic legal system.
Despite a common perception that doctrine concerning the
linkages between municipal and international law is largely academic
and practically obsolete, recent constitutional debates in post-conflict
situations demonstrate the importance these legal issues may
assume. 198 Particularly in contexts where the international
community is exercising a strong measure of support to and influence
over the re-establishment of state structures, international human
rights standards serve as an important basis for the promotion of
"good governance" and the rule of law. The extent to which these
international standards can actually be implemented directly or
indirectly will, from a legal perspective, be determined by the legal
system of a particular state in relation to international law. Such a
determination will usually be found in the Constitution or
constitutional jurisprudence with regard to the specific mechanism by
which international law is incorporated into the municipal law of the
state. This mechanism assumes particular importance in legal
systems and jurisprudences that may challenge the application of
international human rights standards vis-h-vis conflicting customary
principles traditionally applied within some countries, in which Islam
assumes absolute supremacy and in which traditional interpretations
of shari'a may be in conflict with international obligations. In the
absence of a constitutional basis, the municipal legal system can

198.
For an analysis of the international law aspects of post-Cold War
Constitutions, see Vereshchetin, supra note 139.
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disregard international human rights standards enshrined in treaty
instruments or customary international law, unless such a vacuum is
remedied by clarifying legislation or coherent jurisprudence by the
highest court.
In conclusion, it may be worthwhile to capitalize on the
experiences of Afghanistan's constitution-making process as part of
the larger state-building exercise and thus draw on some lessons
learned to explore avenues for future, internationally sponsored,
state-building exercises in similar contexts. First, it has become
evident that the drafting of a new Constitution that meets legal,
political, and cultural requirements can be a considerable challenge
in the context of post-conflict societies that have experienced massive
exodus of human intellectual capital. The success of the drafting
process and the outcome manifested in the Constitution depends on
the drafters' understanding of constitutional law, in general, and the
particularities of the given political, cultural, and legal environment
in a transitional state, in particular. Accordingly, the composition of
constitutional drafting commissions will usually reflect various
professional fields to address and accommodate all requirements for a
broad acceptance of the future Constitution. Such acceptance is a
precondition for the emergence of a "culture of constitutionalism."
In a context in which constitutionalism has played a limited role
throughout past conflict and in which the intellectual elite was
largely forced to seek refuge in Western countries, it may be difficult
to identify impartial national experts who have the necessary
knowledge and expertise to produce a sound legal foundation for the
state. The difficulty of the task is exacerbated by the international
community's inclination to provide technical assistance in the form of
advisors whose impact is contingent upon the acceptance of the
advisors by the national drafters and the advisors' ability to adapt
their expertise to the country-specific context. This requires that
advisors spend time to becoming familiar with the peculiarities of
each state and its history. For the international community to
meaningfully assist in any constitution-making process, sufficient
understanding of both constitutional law and the particular sociopolitical situations are required to develop an internally consistent
Constitution that is able to serve as a legally sound foundation of a
state. Second, given the pace of the constitutional process and the
broader political issues which needed to be resolved in the
Constitution, the constitutional debate in Afghanistan often could not
touch upon issues relating to the "fine-print" of each constitutional
document, but remained focused on the key constitutional decisions,
such as whether the state structure would follow the model of
presidentialismor parliamentarism.
Overall, the time-frame for the development of a draft
Constitution was breathtakingly short in comparison with the tasks
associated with the drafting of such a document, particularly with
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regard to the compromises that had to be made between upholding
Islamic principles and democratic structures. Moreover, it proved
difficult to sensitize the Commission to important technical issues
that bear the potential to become major obstacles in the
implementation of the Constitution. As an overall lesson, time can
play a critical factor in the quality of the Constitution and the extent
to which the international community is able to provide meaningful
technical assistance. The difficulty of drafting a Constitution for a
society in transition lays in finding the proper balance between the
need to provide a legal framework for the state-building exercise and
the quality of the document. Also, a proper balance needs to be struck
between pressuring the national counterparts towards the adoption of
international human rights standards and national traditions. While
the latter may result in hastily dawn-up constitutional provisions
paying lip-service to international standards, they may not
necessarily reflect a real commitment and thus are prone to become
law in the "books," with little application in practice.

